


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
**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 1

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 2

**Image ID:** 15297714



## Special Section

# A Plan to Reshape NATO

By HENRY KISSINGER

*After 35 years of preserving peace in Western Europe, the Atlantic Alliance confronts new military, political and social realities. In this article, a former Secretary of State proposes dramatic—and in his view, vital—steps to help the alliance meet the challenges ahead. Among them: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander should be a European, not an American, as is now the case; Europe should have a decisive voice in certain nuclear arms-control talks and greater responsibility for its ground defense. If Europe refuses to accept that responsibility, the U.S. should withdraw up to half of its ground forces from Europe.*

**L**ebanon and the Soviet succession have preoccupied us in recent weeks, but the Atlantic Alliance must remain the pivot of American policy. On its unity depends the security of free peoples. From its cohesion will flow whatever hopes the Soviet succession offers for a new dialogue. Unfortunately, just as storms recur in nature, crises recur in the Atlantic Alliance. Nearly every Administration for a generation has been involved in them. However, the present controversies in NATO are both unprecedented and unsettling.

In West Germany, Scandinavia, the Low Countries and even in Britain (though to a lesser extent), "peace" movements have been pulling governments in the general direction of their policies, even though those governments disagree with their premises. In addition, the main opposition parties in West Germany and Great Britain—which, in the nature of democratic politics, can be expected to get into office eventually—are advocating policies that amount to unilateral nuclear disarmament for their countries. Because these groups hold sway over key segments of public opinion, too many European leaders—even conservative ones—have yielded to the temptation to demonstrate their peaceful intentions the easy way, by pretending to be reining in a bellicose and insensitive U.S. through their ministrations. As a result, among those who shape public attitudes—and thereby set what become the limits of the politically possible—there is less intellectual or philosophical agreement than in any previous period.

This creates an exceedingly dangerous situation. An alliance cannot live by arms alone. To endure it requires some basic agreement on political aims that justify and give direction to the common defense. If military arrangements provide its only bond, it will sooner or later stagnate. It will surely prove unable to take advantage of diplomatic opportunities for an easing of tensions. That is the central issue before the Atlantic Alliance today. It requires a remedy that is fundamental, even radical—in the literal sense of going to the root.

Four problems in particular are gnawing at the alliance:

1) *Lack of an agreed, credible strategy.* The gap between NATO's formal strategy and what the public will support has widened dangerously. The so-called flexible response devised in the 1960s remains NATO's official doctrine. It contemplates a defense of Europe that begins with conventional weapons and then goes up the ladder of nuclear escalation—until it reaches whatever level is necessary to halt Soviet aggression. In today's circumstances this doctrine has a fatal weakness: neither existing nor projected NATO conventional ground forces are adequate to

repel a major Soviet conventional attack. Therefore, the doctrine would require a nuclear response at an early stage. Yet strategic nuclear parity deprives the threat of strategic nuclear war of much of its credibility; mutual suicide cannot be made to appear

as a rational option. And no alternative nuclear strategy has been developed. Partly for this reason, public opinion, essentially unopposed by most NATO governments, is moving powerfully against any reliance on nuclear weapons—even tactical ones.

The alliance is thereby trapped in a precarious combination of (a) inadequate conventional forces, leading to (b) reliance on nuclear weapons in (c) a strategic environment that makes the threat of their use, and therefore their deterrent value, less and less credible, and (d) a public climate of growing nuclear pacifism that undermines what credibility remains. Lack of a coherent defense policy leaves the alliance, possessing a huge stockpile of enormously destructive weapons, disarming itself psychologically.

2) *Intermediate-range weapons and arms control.* The arrival of the new U.S. intermediate-range weapons in Europe late last year was properly hailed as a major

success. For if public demonstrations and Soviet pressure had succeeded in blocking that deployment, the Soviet Union would in effect have achieved a veto over NATO's military dispositions. But unless the alliance clarifies the purpose of these missiles, the accomplishment is likely to be transitory, since the basic European attitude toward the missiles is that of a host toward a now unwanted guest whose invitation to dinner it would be too awkward to withdraw. Some prominent Europeans purport to see in the missiles' presence a hidden American design to confine a nuclear war to Europe. Others treat them as one of those peculiar American aberrations that periodically upset the alliance's equilibrium. Too few recognize, and even fewer are willing to admit, that in fact the missiles link the strategic nuclear defense of Europe and the U.S. Weapons capable of reaching Soviet territory stake the American homeland to the defense of Europe; they do not enable America to remain immune.

European ambivalence makes it excruciatingly difficult to define "progress" toward arms control, while the nearly desperate eagerness with which progress is pursued makes its attainment less likely. The Soviets have refused even to discuss any proposal balancing U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe against the Soviet arsenal at a lower level. They insist on total withdrawal of American missiles while retaining a large number of their own. The goal of leaving Europe vulnerable to Soviet nuclear blackmail is obvious. Yet significant segments of European opinion persist in blaming the U.S. for the deadlock. In Europe



and in the U.S., this attitude must in time erode the public support needed not only for missile deployment but also for coherent arms control.

3) *East-West relations.* Behind the sharp differences over defense strategy and arms control lies a parallel dispute over the alliance's posture toward the Soviet Union. Too many Europeans accept the caricature of a U.S. run by trigger-happy cowboys whose belligerence has provoked Soviet intransigence. Many Americans, on the other hand, consider such European notions naive and believe that together with the pacifist and neutralist demonstrations, they reflect a trend toward appeasement that encourages Soviet intransigence.

4) *Relations with the Third World.* Most European leaders believe that they have a special opportunity to establish preferential relationships with Third World countries. In the flash points of the Middle East, Africa and Central America, they see U.S. approaches as hopelessly tainted by an obsession with Soviet ambitions; some hope to win favor in the Third World by an ostentatious dissociation from the U.S. More than a few Americans view such behavior as a free ride paid for by U.S. sacrifices or as a positive incitement to Third World radicalism.

These differences could be healthy if they led to compatible and constructive policies for the 1980s and '90s. So far this has not happened. Mutual recriminations have created opportunities for Soviet political warfare even during this period of stagnation in the Kremlin leadership. The Politburo is obviously convinced that the West has become so paralyzed concerning nuclear weapons that there is no urgency about nuclear arms control; the Soviets can simply wait for a while to harvest the fruits of Western anxieties. By contrast, there may be concern in Moscow that NATO will move to close the gap in conventional forces; hence the willingness to resume the talks, moribund for ten years, about limiting conventional arms. Does this reflect a genuine interest in arms control, or is it a means to thwart the desperately needed Western conventional buildup by creating the same conditions by which public opinion was mobilized on the missile question? And what is one to make of the almost deferential pleas by all major NATO countries for the resumption of a dialogue that the Soviets have interrupted? Or of the upgrading of all major European delegations except the French to the Andropov funeral, compared with the Brezhnev rites 15 months ago—especially as Andropov's rule was marked by the flagrant attempt to influence the German election, the walkout from arms-control talks and the shooting down of the Korean airliner, not to speak of Andropov's 15-year stewardship of the KGB?

Will the Soviets see Western pleas for dialogue as a demonstration of good will, or will they learn from the compulsion to demonstrate good intentions after months of harassment that intransigence pays because the West has weak nerves? Will we fail to relax tensions because the Soviets conclude that atmospherics can substitute for dealing with the real causes dividing the world? Europe is not moderating the U.S., and the U.S. is not stiffening Europe's spine, as the folklore on each side would have it. More likely, each is in danger of paralyzing and demoralizing the other. Western disunity is perhaps the principal obstacle to progress in East-West negotiations.

This state of affairs has deeper causes than particular policies on either side. The present NATO structure is simply not working, either in defining the threat or in finding methods to meet it.

Existing arrangements are unbalanced. When one country dominates the alliance on all major issues—when that one country chooses weapons and decides deployments, conducts the arms-control negotiations, sets the tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the framework for relations with the Third World—little incentive remains

**A European officer should take the traditionally American place as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, probably with a U.S. deputy.**

for a serious joint effort to redefine the requirements of security or to coordinate foreign policies. Such joint efforts entail sacrifices and carry political costs. Leaders are not likely to make the sacrifice or pay the cost unless they feel responsible for the results.

An imbalance such as the one now existing cannot be corrected by "consultation," however meticulous. In the long run, consultation works only when those being consulted have a capacity for independent action. Then each side

takes the other seriously; then each side knows that the other's consent has to be won. Otherwise consultation becomes "briefing." Agreement reflects not conviction but acquiescence for want of an alternative.

The present imbalance is not new. It has existed ever since World War II. But military dependence on another nation has a cumulative impact. When dependence no longer results from wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under conditions of relative prosperity, it can breed guilt, self-hatred and a compulsion to display independence of the U.S. wherever doing so is safe, especially with regard to some Third World issues and certain aspects of East-West relations.

The problem has become even more acute because the generation of leaders that built NATO has virtually disappeared. Those who governed Europe during the early postwar years were still psychologically of the era when Europe bestrode the world. Global thinking came naturally. European leaders assumed responsibility for their own security policies and gave it up only reluctantly because of special circumstances. But nearly 40 years have passed since the end of World War II. The new leaders were reared in an era when the U.S. was pre-eminent; they find it politically convenient to delegate Europe's military defense to us. Too many seek to position themselves somewhere between the superpowers—the first step toward psychological neutralism. Thus Europe's schizophrenia: a fear that the U.S. might not be prepared to risk its own population on a nuclear defense of Europe, coupled with the anxiety that America might drag Europe into an unwanted conflict by clumsy handling of Third World issues or East-West relations.

The rush to condemn our actions in Grenada by so many of our European allies is a case in point. What could have been in the minds of their leaders? Even making allowance—especially in the case of Britain—for totally inadequate consultation, they could hardly have wanted us to fail. That would surely have affected our willingness to run risks in defense of other areas, ultimately including even Europe. Rather, they must have assumed that their actions were irrelevant and costless: that we would not be deterred, that we would exact no penalty and that therefore it was safe to use the incident to score points with "progressives" at home and with Third World radicals abroad.

**T**he change in the nature of European leadership has been paralleled in the U.S. Our new elites do not reject NATO any more than do their European counterparts. But for them, too, the alliance is more a practical than an emotional necessity, more a military arrangement than a set of common political purposes.

On both sides of the Atlantic, we find ourselves threatened by the dominance of domestic politics over global political strategy. In Europe this leads in too many countries to a faintly disguised neutralism. In the U.S. it accelerates our already strong tendency toward unilateralism and isolationism.

U.S. leaders have too often adjusted foreign policies to political pressures, bureaucratic infighting or changing intellectual fashions. The history of the American attitude toward intermediate-range missiles in Europe is an example. These were proposed to the Europeans in 1957-58, in-

**Europe should take over those arms-control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil.**

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stalled in Britain, Italy and Turkey by 1960 and withdrawn in 1963. They reappeared later in 1963 as part of a NATO multilateral force, and were abandoned once again by 1965. They were put before NATO for the third time in 1978 and accepted once again in 1979. Not surprisingly, Europeans organizing to stop the current deployment are encouraged by the knowledge that previous American decisions have not proved immutable.

Similarly, our allies have had to adjust from passionate U.S. advocacy of SALT II to its rejection, and then to the fact that we have chosen to observe a treaty we refuse to ratify; from a strategic doctrine of massive retaliation to one of flexible response; from a policy of détente to one of confrontation and back to conciliation, not to speak of the gyrations in our Middle East policy—all in addition to the reassessments that occur whenever a new Administration comes into office. Each change of course leaves victims among European leaders who have staked their domestic positions on policies that the U.S. later abandons. Each lurch encourages a kind of neutralism, as Europeans seek to avoid being made hostage to sudden swings in American policy.

A continuation of existing trends is bound to lead to the demoralization of the Western alliance. An explicit act of statesmanship is needed to give new meaning to Western unity and a new vitality to NATO. In my view such an effort must have three components: (a) a more significant role for Europe within NATO, (b) a reform of the NATO organization and (c) a reassessment of current NATO deployment.

### A NEW ROLE FOR EUROPE

During the entire post-World War II period it has been an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a strong, united Europe was an essential component of the Atlantic partnership. We have applied that principle with dedication and imagination, insofar as it depended on American actions, in all areas except security. With respect to defense, the U.S. has been indifferent at best—at least since the failure of the European Defense Community—to any sort of Europeanization. Many in this country seemed to fear that a militarily unified Europe might give less emphasis to transatlantic relations or might botch its defense effort and thus weaken the common security. The opposite is almost certainly the case.

In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination. What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its external barriers are higher than its internal ones. In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation with the U.S. A Europe analyzing its security needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find association with the U.S. essential. Greater unity in defense would also help to overcome the logistical nightmare caused by the attempt of every European nation to stretch already inadequate defense efforts across the whole panoply of weapons. For example, there are at least five kinds of battle tanks within NATO, different types of artillery and different standards for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In a major conflict it would be nearly impossible to keep this hodgepodge of forces supplied.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires Europe to develop greater identity and coherence in the field of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burden sharing," paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind something more structural—a more rational balance of responsibilities. The present allocation of responsibilities fails to bring the allies to reflect naturally about either security or political objectives. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise. But since drift will surely lead to unraveling—if more imperceptibly—statesmanship impels a new approach.

### STRUCTURAL REFORM

Structural reform cannot substitute for a sense of purpose and clear doctrine. But if pursued with care and sensitivity, it can help catalyze the development of shared political purposes. These common objectives require that European judgments on security, East-West diplomacy and other matters emerge from Europe's own analysis. Mere acquiescence in American decisions, briefings and pressures provides a façade of unity; shared purposes require a deeper sense of participation. Specifically:

1) By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for conventional ground defense. This is well within the capability of a group of countries with nearly one and one-half times the population and twice the G.N.P. of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, moreover, have to divide their forces on at least two fronts.

2) This requires that planning for Europe's defense become a more explicitly European task. Heretofore, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has been American. In the new arrangement a European officer should take that traditionally American place, probably with a U.S. deputy. Such a change is also likely to give a new perspective to allied strategic planning. The U.S. has generally achieved its military successes by the weight of the equipment that our vast industrial potential has made available. This has tended to tempt our military leaders to equate strategy with logistics. European nations have rarely enjoyed such a material margin; rather, they have had to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics—precisely what NATO needs in an age of nuclear parity and renewed emphasis on conventional defense.

3) Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary-General, who is responsible for running the alliance's political machinery, has been European. In the new structure, with its greater emphasis on political coordination, it would make more sense for this official to be American—whenever the new Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, decides to retire. Meantime, no Western leader is better qualified for guiding NATO's transition than the wise and thoughtful Carrington.

4) Europe should take over those arms-control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil. The INF negotiations with the Soviets (for intermediate-range missiles) and the MBFR negotiations (on conventional forces) have heretofore been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a European chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though predominantly European, delegation.

**T**he structure that I am proposing would enable Europeans to confront—on their own initiative and in their own context—issues that have been evaded for at least two decades: the precise definition of an adequate conventional defense; the nature of the so-called nuclear threshold—the point where there is no choice except conventional defeat or nuclear escalation; the relationship between strategy and arms control. Since nuclear weapons would presumably be used only if conventional defense failed, Europe would be responsible for setting the nuclear threshold by its own efforts; it could relieve its nuclear anxieties by the simple expedient of augmenting its conventional defenses.

By the same token, European leadership in the MBFR and INF negotiations would place final responsibility for both conventional force levels and intermediate-range missile deployment in Europe with the leaders whose countries will have to bear the brunt—for good or ill—of the outcome of these negotiations. This is especially important with respect to the American intermediate-range missiles in Europe. That deployment makes sense only if the allies genuinely believe that the prospect of a nuclear blow from Europe



on Soviet territory will help deter a Soviet conventional attack or nuclear blackmail. If our principal allies do not share this conviction, the psychological basis for the deployment will evaporate.

European chairmanship of the INF talks would oblige Europe's leaders to face the issue head-on; their domestic critics would no longer be able to argue (as they do now) that U.S. intransigence is the principal obstacle to arms control.

As for the U.S., it would of course participate in these deliberations—in a less dominant position—through its continued membership in the integrated command, its responsibility for nuclear defense, and its ground, naval and air forces in Europe.

### REDEPLOYMENT

The issue of redeploying American forces touches raw European nerves like no other. The slightest hint of altering present arrangements jangles sensibilities; it evokes fears of American withdrawal and prospects of European neutralism. But if present trends continue, it is certain to become a central issue in the alliance relationship. Before dealing with it in the context of a program of NATO reform, a few facts must be noted:

1) The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s, when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation—to react to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. Massive retaliation paradoxically required that the total forces on the Continent be kept below the level required for conventional defense. NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by doing anything to suggest that a Western response would be limited to nonnuclear means. Hence the American conventional deployment in Europe reflected political, not military, criteria: it was intended to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation and to leave the Soviets no doubt that this would be the consequence of even a conventional war. European conventional forces represented a similar political decision: they too were conceived as a trip wire for our nuclear riposte. From the birth of NATO a full conventional defense has been part neither of its strategy nor of its efforts.

2) This situation became anomalous when the growth of Soviet strategic forces deprived general nuclear war of much of its credibility. Yet NATO deployment has been essentially unaffected by the change. NATO has improved its conventional defenses but has not closed the gap in such forces. As the current NATO commander made clear recently, even counting the five American divisions that have remained in Europe, the alliance is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet ground attack for more than a few days. European ambivalence continues 35 years after NATO's creation. Our allies remain unwilling to develop forces strong enough to provide an alternative to nuclear weapons—and yet much of their public opinion shies away from even thinking about nuclear deterrence.

3) Were we to start all over again, we would therefore hardly repeat the decision of the '50s in today's circumstances. Let us assume a group of wise men and women from both sides of the Atlantic came together to plan a global strategy unconstrained by the past. Assume further that it started from the premise that ultimately the defense of the West is indivisible and that European security should be viewed under the aspect of the defense of the West in Europe—as a thoughtful French observer, Francois de Rose, put it. Such a group would almost surely conclude that the sensible division of responsibilities would be for Europe, with economic resources and manpower exceeding those of the Soviet Union, to concentrate on the conventional defense of the Continent. To maintain the global balance of power—by definition as essential for Europe as for

**If nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent to even conventional attack, a gradual withdrawal of up to half of our ground forces would be logical.**

America—the U.S. would emphasize highly mobile conventional forces capable of backing up Europe and contributing to the defense of, for example, the Middle East, Asia or the Western Hemisphere.

Such a division of responsibilities would also enable our military establishment to shift some of its intellectual energies and scientific research from a hypothetical esoteric war in an area where we have major allies to the defense of regions where conflict is much

more likely. In such regions our allies are less prone to see their interests immediately engaged, and the countries being threatened are in a worse position to assist in the defense effort.

**E**ven if we were to start all over again, an irrefutable case would exist for maintaining considerable American ground forces in Europe. This would be essential to keep our allies from feeling abandoned and to eliminate any Soviet misunderstanding that the defense of Europe no longer reflects a vital American interest. In a new division of responsibilities we should also preserve and preferably strengthen existing U.S. land-based airpower on the Continent. And we should continue our responsibility for both strategic and tactical nuclear defense, assuming that we and the Europeans could agree on a strategy for the latter. American intermediate-range missiles should remain in Europe to "couple" the nuclear defenses of both sides of the Atlantic so long as European leaders desired them. No change in naval deployments would be involved.

Why then is such a division of responsibilities not realized? The principal obstacle is psychological. For all their criticisms of American policy, Europeans dread a return to isolationism in the U.S. Americans fear that any tinkering with deployment would drive Europe into explicit neutralism. And some in the Pentagon would rather maintain our troops in Europe in a less than rational deployment than return a portion to the U.S., where they are more exposed to congressional budget cutters.

In my view, persisting in a deployment that is losing its rationale accelerates these attitudes. Pacifism and neutralism are on the march in Europe even under the present setup; isolationism in America is not yet so vocal but is being powerfully encouraged by endless allied disputes. An alliance that cannot agree on its political premises cannot sustain itself by clinging to military arrangements decided a generation ago in totally different circumstances. With current trends the issue of the rationale for the NATO deployment will become unavoidable. If it arises not as an integral component in a comprehensive design but as a single question of whether to continue stationing American troops in Europe, unilateral changes will be arbitrarily imposed by the potentially most destructive means—the American budgetary process. Then indeed we might see in America a psychological wrench away from Europe and in Europe a panicky resentment against the U.S. A change in deployment without a positive political and strategic purpose, withdrawal for its own sake, might shock our allies into neutralism; it could mislead our adversary and tempt aggression.

There is an urgent need for a serious and rapid re-examination of NATO doctrine, deployment and policies, conducted by men and women known for their dedication to Western unity. The group—to be formed immediately after our elections—must begin with one of the most divisive issues before the alliance: an agreement

on the nature and scope of the threat. The group must avoid the tendency of previous such efforts, which set unrealistic goals and thereby magnified the problem. A deadline for completion should be set—certainly no longer than two years.

Theoretically, such a study could lead to one of three outcomes: 1) The group could come to the same conclusions about the optimum division of responsibilities in an agreed global strategy outlined above. Given the dis-

**We must not let our future pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and neoisolationists who systematically seek to undermine all joint efforts.**

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agreements about the nature of the interests involved in regions outside of Europe and the domestic priorities of most European countries, such a conclusion, however rational, is extremely improbable. 2) The group could agree that the strategic interests of the West require a full conventional defense, but that for practical and psychological reasons, Europe can undertake the required effort only if the present American ground deployment in Europe is maintained intact. 3) The group could decide that the realities of European domestic politics preclude more than the current gradualistic, marginal improvement of defense efforts.

I hope very much that Europe would choose the second option. If Europe should agree to build a full conventional defense and were prepared to express that commitment in unambiguous yearly obligations to increase its forces, the U.S. should accept the judgment that its present ground forces in Europe are an indispensable component. Such a decision might in fact invigorate the conventional arms-reduction talks and in time lead to stability at a lower level. But if Europe should opt for a perpetuation of the present ambivalence or for only a token improvement, then the U.S. will owe it to the overall requirements of global defense to draw certain conclusions. If Europe by its own decision condemns itself to permanent conventional inferiority, we will have no choice but to opt for a deployment of U.S. forces in Europe that makes strategic and political sense. If nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent to even conventional attack, a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion, perhaps up to half, of our present ground forces would be a logical result. To provide time for necessary adjustments, that withdrawal could be extended over five years. To ease the transition further, we could, if Europe agreed, keep the excess ground forces in Europe for a time afterward in a new status analogous to that of the French forces, prepared for use in Europe but also available for use in emergencies outside it. Any withdrawal would make sense only if the redeployed forces were added to our strategic reserve; if they were disbanded, the effect would be to weaken the overall defense.

The proposed redeployment would leave intact air and naval forces, as well as intermediate-range missiles, so long as Europe wants them. A useful byproduct of the process would be a systematic re-evaluation of the existing inventory of very short-range tactical nuclear weapons, a legacy of three decades of *ad hoc* decisions; these weapons now represent at one and the same time an increment to deterrence and the greatest danger of unintended nuclear war because, being deployed so far forward, they are unusually subject to the exigencies of battle.

In this scheme, withdrawal would be not an end in itself—as it will if frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic go much further—but one component of an adaptation to new circumstances extending over some eight years that rededicates the U.S. to the alliance for the indefinite future.

Psychology is immensely important in international relations, especially when policies turn not only on cold, professional assessments of the national interest by trained political leaders, but on public opinion. I would like to believe that restructuring the alliance to give Europeans greater responsibility for their own defense, while important American forces remain in Europe, will be seen not as an abandonment but as an embrace of Europe. It is a means of enlisting Europeans as full partners in the process of decision on which their safety as well as ours depends. For a son of Europe reared on the existing NATO orthodoxy, the very idea of even a partial redeployment is painful—all the more so after Lebanon. But we will not be fulfilling our obligations to the West if we fail to put forward an initiative to forestall the crisis that will otherwise confront us in much worse circumstances.

### POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

By themselves, neither organizational nor doctrinal adaptations can remedy the political incoherence rending NATO. This article has emphasized security issues. However, a few general observations on the alliance's political problems are necessary.

1) Those leaders on either side of the Atlantic who value the alliance, with all its failings, as the ultimate guardian of Western freedom must seek urgently to end political disputes over East-West relations and North-South policy, especially Western conduct in the flash points of conflict in the Third World. The tendency to grandstand before domestic audiences, the growing self-righteousness, will in time make a mockery of the key assumption of the Atlantic Alliance: that we share a common approach to security. Defense requires after all some agreed political purpose in the name of which it is conducted. The Atlantic Alliance must urgently develop a grand strategy for East-West problems and Third World relations applicable for the rest of this century. Otherwise, it will tempt constant pressures and crises.

2) The U.S. cannot lead the alliance or even contribute to its cohesion if we do not restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy. Ever since the Viet Nam War, we have disquieted our friends and confused, where we have not emboldened, our adversaries by periodic wide swings on essential elements of our policies. But the national interest does not change every four or eight years. At

some point the national interest must be accepted by our public as clearly recognizable and constant. Otherwise, we shall become a source of dangerous instability, still relevant for our power but irrelevant for our ideas. A presidential election year is probably not an ideal time to forge a bipartisan consensus. But whoever wins the presidential election faces no more important and urgent challenge than to restore the element of bipartisanship to our foreign policy.

3) European governments must meet head-on the disturbing trends toward pacifism and neutralism in their countries. These movements are led by people of conviction; they cannot be defused by accommodation. They can only be resisted with a compelling vision of a new future. If European governments continue to humor those who profess to see the danger to the peace in a bellicose America, not an intransigent Soviet Union, they will find themselves making concession after concession and will become hostages of their critics.

The current condition of the alliance cries out for a rethinking of its structure, its doctrine and its unifying purposes. The creativity and courage with which we approach this challenge will determine whether the alliance enters a new and dynamic period or gradually withers.


I have outlined proposals to reinvigorate allied cohesion by defining clear responsibilities for each side of the Atlantic, to be implemented over a period of years. On that basis European leaders could defend cooperation with the U.S. as something they sought as a matter of their own conviction and in their own national interest. American leaders would have a rational, understandable policy to defend and would benefit from dealing with a more equal partner. A new era of allied creativity and American dedication could give inspiration to the generation that has come to maturity since World War II and since the postwar crises that infused NATO's founders with their sense of common purpose.

We must not let our future pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and neoisolationists who systematically seek to undermine all joint efforts. The nations bordering the North Atlantic need above all faith in themselves and the will to resist the siren calls of those who use fear and panic as instruments of policy or domestic debate. In the end we must fulfill our trust: to preserve and strengthen a North Atlantic alliance that represents the hope of human dignity and decency in our world. ■



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 8

**Image ID:** 15297720



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 9

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Wither the Atlantic Alliance? - A Program of Reform


Just as storms recur in nature, crises recur in the Atlantic Alliance. Nearly every Administration for a generation has been involved in them.

However, the present turmoil in NATO has one crucial aspect which is both unprecedented and unsettling: At a time when the governments themselves are philosophically more compatible than they have been for a long while tensions are building beneath the surface. The visible disputes about policies are surrogates for a widening incompatibility of prevailing attitudes on the two sides of the Atlantic. This bodes ill for the future unless those attitudes can be changed.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, Scandinavia, the Low Countries and recently even in Great Britain, though to a lesser extent, well-organized and financed "peace" movements have been pulling governments in the general direction of their policies despite the fact

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 10

**Image ID:** 15297722



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 11

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that those governments disagree with their premises.


Because of the "peace" movements' sway over key segments of public opinion, too many European leaders--even conservative ones--have yielded to the temptation to demonstrate their peaceful intentions the easy way, by pretending to be reining in a bellicose and insensitive United States through their balancing ministrations. As a result among those who shape public attitudes--and thereby set what become the limits of the politically possible--there is less intellectual or philosophical agreement than in any previous period.

This creates an exceedingly dangerous situation.

An alliance cannot live by arms alone. To endure it requires some basic agreement on the political aims which justify and give direction to the common defense. If military arrangements provide its only bond, it will sooner or later disintegrate--especially if there is

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 12

**Image ID:** 15297724



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 13

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also disagreement about the nature of the threat. That is the central issue before the Atlantic Alliance today. It requires a fundamental, even radical--in the literal sense, of going to the root--remedy.


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Among the problems now gnawing at the Alliance, four in particular stand out:

1. Lack of an agreed, credible strategy. The gap between NATO's formal strategy and what the public will support has widened dangerously. The so-called "flexible response" devised in the 1960s, remains NATO's official doctrine. It contemplates a defense of Europe that begins with conventional weapons and then goes up the ladder of nuclear escalation--reaching whatever level is necessary to halt Soviet aggression. The fatal weakness of this doctrine, in today's circumstances, derives from the fact that neither the existing nor the projected NATO

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 14

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 15

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
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conventional forces are adequate to repel a major Soviet conventional attack. Therefore, the doctrine would require a nuclear response at an early stage. Yet the present conditions of strategic nuclear parity deprive the threat of strategic nuclear war of much of its credibility; mutual suicide cannot be made to appear as a rational option. And no alternative nuclear strategy has been developed. Partly for this reason public opinion, essentially unopposed by the NATO governments, is moving powerfully against any reliance on nuclear weapons--even tactical nuclear weapons.

The Alliance is thereby trapped in a precarious combination of (a) inadequate conventional forces, leading to (b) reliance on nuclear weapons, in (c) a strategic environment that makes the threat of their use, and therefore their deterrent value, less and less credible, and (d) a public climate of growing nuclear pacifism that undermines

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 16

**Image ID:** 15297728



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 17

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what credibility otherwise remains. The lack of a coherent defense policy leaves the Alliance, possessing a huge stockpile of enormously destructive weapons, disarming itself psychologically.


2. Intermediate range weapons and arms control.

The arrival of the first American intermediate range weapons in Europe a few weeks ago was properly hailed as a considerable success. For if the combination of public demonstrations and Soviet pressure had succeeded in blocking that deployment the Soviet Union would in effect have achieved a veto over NATO's military dispositions. But unless the Alliance clarifies the purpose these missiles are supposed to serve, the accomplishment is likely to be transitory.

For the basic European attitude toward the missiles remains that of a host toward a now unwanted guest whose previous invitation to dinner it would be too

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 18

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 19

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
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awkward to withdraw. Some prominent Europeans purport to see in the missiles' presence a hidden American design to confine a nuclear war to Europe. Others treat them as one of those peculiar American aberrations that periodically upset the Alliance's equilibrium. Too few recognize, and even fewer are willing to admit, that in fact the missiles link the strategic nuclear defense of Europe and the United States; they are a means of emphasizing America's commitment to the defense of Europe, not a way to escape it.

European ambivalence makes it excruciatingly difficult to define "progress" toward an acceptable arms control agreement on the subject, while the nearly desperate eagerness with which "progress" is pursued makes its achievement less likely. The Soviets have refused even to discuss any proposal that would balance American intermediate range missiles in Europe against the Soviet arsenal at

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 20

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 21

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
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a lower level. They insist on a total withdrawal of American missiles while retaining a substantial number of their own. The Soviet goal of leaving Europe vulnerable to Soviet blackmail is obvious. Yet significant segments of European opinion persist in blaming the United States for the deadlock. Both in Europe and in the United States, this attitude must in time erode the public support needed both for the missile deployment, and for coherent arms control.

3. East-West relations. Behind the sharp differences over defense strategy and arms control lies a parallel dispute over the posture the alliance should take toward the Soviet Union--a dispute which reflects sharp differences in assessments of the United States, as well as in attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Too many Europeans accept the caricature of their political cartoons to the effect that the United States is run by belligerent cowboys

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 22

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 23

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
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and that U.S. belligerence has provoked Soviet intransigence. Even the more conciliatory tone adopted recently by the United States has not changed this attitude. Many Americans, on the other hand, consider such European preconceptions naive and believe that together with the waves of pacifist and neutralist demonstrations, they reflect a trend toward appeasement which encourages Soviet intransigence.

4. Relations with the Third World. Most European leaders believe that they have a special opportunity to establish preferential relationships with countries in the Third World. In the flashpoints of the Middle East, Africa and Central America, they consider U.S. approaches as hopelessly tainted by an obsession with Soviet ambitions; and some, whatever their own views, perceive an opening they can exploit in the Third World by an ostentatious dissociation from the United States. More than a few Americans view such European behavior

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 24

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 25

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
either as a free ride paid for by U.S. sacrifices or  
as a positive incitement to Third World radicalism.

\* \* \* \*

These differences could be healthy if out of them  
emerged compatible and constructive policies for the  
1980s and '90s. So far this has not happened. Mutual  
recreminations have mounted, creating opportunities for  
Soviet political warfare even during this period of stagnation  
in the Kremlin leadership. The Politburo is obviously  
convinced that the West has become so paralyzed with  
respect to nuclear weapons that there is no urgency about  
nuclear arms control; it can simply wait for a while  
to harvest the fruits of Western anxieties. By contrast,  
there may be some concern in Moscow that NATO will move  
to close the gap in conventional forces; hence the willingness  
to resume the talks about limiting conventional arms  
which have been moribund for ten years. Does it reflect

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 26

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 27

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
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a genuine interest in arms control or is it a means to place obstacles in the way of the desperately needed Western conventional build-up by creating the same conditions by which public opinion was mobilized on the missile question? One may be permitted to question Soviet devotion to controlling conventional weapons at a moment when Soviet arms are streaming into Third World trouble spots everywhere from the Middle East to the Caribbean. In short, Europe is not moderating the United States, and the United States is not stiffening Europe's spine, as the folklore on each side of the Atlantic would have it. More likely, each side of the Atlantic is in danger of paralyzing and demoralizing the other.

This state of affairs has proceeded too far to be blamed on particular policies or specific actions on either side. The trouble lies deeper. With respect to some issues, the fact seems to be--to put it delicately--

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 28  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 29

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
that interests are no longer inevitably perceived as common. And even where the common interest is still taken for granted, as it is in the defense field, the existing structure is simply not working, either in defining the threat or arriving at methods to meet it.

Existing arrangements are unbalanced. When one country dominates the alliance--on all major issues--when that one country chooses weapons and decides deployments, when it conducts the arms control negotiations, sets the tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the framework for relations with the Third World--little incentive remains for a serious joint effort to redefine the requirements of security or to coordinate foreign policies. Such joint efforts entail sacrifices and carry political costs. Leaders are not likely to make the sacrifice or pay the cost unless they feel responsible for the results.

An imbalance such as the one now existing cannot

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 30

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 31

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
be made up for by "consultation," however meticulous.

In the long run, consultation works only when those being consulted have an alternative and a capacity for independent action. Then each side takes the other seriously; then each side knows that the other's consent has to be won. Then each has an incentive to be responsible. Otherwise consultation becomes "briefing". Agreement reflects not conviction but acquiescence for want of an alternative.

It cannot be an accident that the European country least beset by pacifism and neutralism is France which has also been most insistent on making its own judgments on matters of defense. The present imbalance is not new. It has existed ever since World War II. But dependence on another nation has a cumulative impact. When the feeling of impotence no longer results from the unavoidable necessity of wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under conditions of relative prosperity, it can

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 32

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 33

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
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become destructive. Against that economic background,,  
Europe's continued military dependence on the United  
States breeds a combination of guilt, self-hatred, and  
a compulsion to display independence of the United  
States wherever doing so is possible and safe, especially  
with regard to some Third World issues and certain aspects  
of East-West relations.

The problem has become even more acute because the  
generation of leaders that built NATO has virtually disappeared.  
Those who governed Europe during those early postwar  
years were still psychologically of the era when Europe  
bestrode the world. Global thinking came naturally.  
European leaders assumed responsibility for their own  
nations' security policies as a matter of tradition,  
and gave it up only reluctantly because of special postwar  
circumstances. But nearly forty years have passed now  
since the end of World War II. The new generation of

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 34  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 35

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
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leaders was reared in an era when the United States was preeminent. Sheltered by the same alliance which is under assault by their publics, they take it for granted that they can delegate the military defense of Europe to us. For the rest, too many of them seek to position themselves somewhere between the superpowers--the first step toward psychological neutralism. Thus the European schizophrenia: a fear that the United States might not be prepared to risk its own population on a nuclear defense of Europe, coupled simultaneously with the anxiety that America might drag Europe into an unwanted conflict by its clumsy handling of Third World issues or East-West relations.

The rush to condemn our actions in Grenada by so many of our European allies is a case in point. What could have been in the minds of their leaders? Even making allowance--especially in the case of Britain--

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 36

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 37

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
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for totally inadequate consultation, and whatever their view of the wisdom or necessity of our actions, they could hardly have wanted us to fail. That would surely have affected our willingness to run risks in defense of other areas--ultimately including even Europe. Rather, they must have assumed that their actions were irrelevant and costless: that we would not be deterred, that we would exact no penalty, and that therefore it was safe to use the incident to score a few points with "progressive" constituencies at home and with Third World radicals abroad. Needless to say this attitude was deeply resented in the United States.

The change in the nature of European leadership has been paralleled in the United States. Our new elites do not reject NATO any more than do their European counterparts. But for them, too, the alliance is more a practical than an emotional necessity, more a military arrangement than

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 38  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 39

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
a set of common political purposes.

On both sides of the Atlantic, we find ourselves threatened by the dominance of domestic politics over global political strategy. In Europe this leads in too many countries to a faintly disguised neutralism. In the United States it accelerates our already strong tendency toward unilateralism and isolationism.

U.S. leaders have too often adjusted foreign policies to political pressures, bureaucratic infighting, or changing intellectual fashions. The history of the American attitude toward intermediate range missiles in Europe is a case in point. These were proposed to the Europeans in 1958, installed in Italy and Turkey in 1960 and withdrawn in 1962. They then reappeared in 1963 as a part of a so-called NATO multilateral force, and were abandoned once again in 1965. They were put before NATO for the third time in 1978 and then embodied in the current "double

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 40

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 41

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
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track" decision in 1979. Not surprisingly, those Europeans organizing to stop the current deployment are encouraged by their knowledge that previous American decisions have not proved immutable.

Similarly, in a matter of months, our allies have had to adjust from passionate U.S. advocacy of SALT II to its rejection, and then to the fact that we have chosen to observe a treaty we refuse to ratify; from a strategic doctrine of massive retaliation to one of flexible response; from a policy of detente to a policy of confrontation and back to conciliation--all in addition to the reassessments that in the past decade have occurred automatically whenever a new administration comes into office. Each change of course leaves victims among European leaders who have staked their domestic positions on policies which the United States later abandons. Each lurch encourages a kind of neutralism, as Europeans seek to avoid being

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 42

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 43

**Image ID:** 15297755

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made hostage to sudden swings in American policy.

A continuation of existing trends is bound to lead first to stagnation and in time to the disintegration of the Western Alliance. An explicit act of statesmanship is needed to give new meaning to Western unity and a new vitality to NATO. In my view such an effort must have three components: (a) a more significant role for Europe within NATO, (b) a reform of the NATO organization and (c) a reassessment of current NATO deployment.


I shall discuss these in turn.

#### A New Role for Europe

During the entire post-World War II period it has been an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a strong, united Europe was an essential component of the Atlantic partnership. We have applied that principle with dedication and imagination--in so far as it depended on American actions--in all

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 44

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 45

**Image ID:** 15297757

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areas except security. With respect to defense, however, the United States has been indifferent at best--at least since the failure of the European Defense Community--to any sort of Europeanization. Many in this country seemed to fear that a militarily unified Europe might give less emphasis to transatlantic relations or that it might botch its defense effort and thus weaken the common security.


The opposite is almost certainly the case.

In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination. What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its external barriers are higher than its internal ones.

In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation with the United States. A Europe analyzing its security needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 46

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 47

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
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association with the United States essential. Greater European unity in defense would also help to overcome the looming logistical nightmare caused by the attempt of every European nation to stretch its already inadequate defense effort across the whole panoply of modern weapons. For example, there are five kinds of battle tanks within NATO, different types of artillery and different standards for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In case of a major conflict it will be nearly impossible to keep this hodge-podge of forces supplied.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires Europe to develop a greater identity and a more distinctly European coherence in the field of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burdensharing," of paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind something more structural--a more rational balance of responsibilities between the two sides of the Atlantic.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 48

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 49

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
My basic reason for proposing this is not that the financial burdens are unfairly distributed--although they are.

Rather the present allocation of responsibilities simply makes no sense. It fails to bring the allies to reflect naturally about either security or political objectives. Neither side of the Atlantic has by itself sufficient incentive for a long-range objective study of the choices posed by the new situation. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise. But since drift will surely lead to unraveling--if more imperceptibly--statesmanship impels a new approach.

#### Structural Reform

Structural reform cannot substitute for a sense of purpose and clear doctrine. But if pursued with care and sensitivity it can help catalyze the development of shared political purposes. In my view these common objectives require that European judgments on security

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 50  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 51

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and East-West diplomacy (and other matters) emerge from Europe's own analysis. Mere acquiescence in American decisions, briefings, and pressures provides a facade of unity; shared purposes require a deeper sense of participation.


Specifically:

1. By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for the conventional ground defense. This is well within the capability of a continent with nearly one and one half times the population and twice the GNP of the Soviet Union, which moreover has to divide its forces on at least two fronts.

2. To reflect the new responsibilities, a European officer should by then take the traditionally American place as "Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe" (SACEUR), probably with a U.S. deputy. Such a change is also likely to give a new perspective to Allied strategic

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 52

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 53

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
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planning. The United States has generally achieved its military successes by the weight of the equipment which our superior industrial potential made available. This has tempted our military leaders to equate strategy with logistics. European nations have rarely enjoyed such a material margin; they have had to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics--precisely what NATO needs in an age of nuclear parity and renewed emphasis on conventional defense.

3. Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary General--the official responsible for running the political machinery of NATO--has been European. In the new structure it would make more sense for the Secretary General to be American--whenever the new Secretary General, Lord Carrington, decides to retire. This would reflect the need for political coordination on both sides of the Atlantic. In the meantime, there is no Western leader better qualified for guiding

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 54

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 55

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
NATO's transition than the wise and able new Secretary General.

4. Europe should take over those arms control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil. The INF negotiations with the Soviets (involving intermediate range missiles) and the MBFR negotiations (concerning conventional ground forces) have heretofore been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a European chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though predominantly European, delegation.

The structure I propose would enable Europeans to confront--on their own initiative and in their own context-- a whole series of issues that have been evaded for at least two decades: the precise definition of an adequate conventional defense; the nature of the so-called nuclear threshold--the point where there is no choice except conventional defeat or nuclear escalation; the relationship

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 56

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 57

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
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between strategy and arms control. A European SACEUR will minimize the temptation of European leaders to justify sacrifices as a response to American pressure. Since nuclear weapons would presumably be used only if conventional defense fails, Europe would bear the responsibility for setting the nuclear threshold by its own efforts; it could relieve its nuclear anxieties by the simple expedient of augmenting its conventional defenses. And if it did not, increased reliance on American nuclear guarantees and deployments would clearly be Europe's own choice.

By the same token, European leadership in the MBFR and INF negotiations would place the final responsibility for both conventional force levels and the intermediate range missile deployment in Europe with the leaders whose countries will have to bear the brunt--for good or ill--of the outcome of these negotiations. This is especially important with respect to the American intermediate range

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 58

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 59

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
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missiles in Europe. That deployment makes sense only if the allies genuinely believe that the prospect of a nuclear blow from Europe on Soviet territory contributes significantly to deterring a Soviet conventional attack. If our principal allies do not share this conviction-- if they indulge the absurd suspicion that American missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union are a subterfuge to confine such a war to Europe or if they agree to these missiles only as a kind of favor in response to American entreaties--the psychological basis for the deployment will evaporate.

European chairmanship of the INF negotiations would oblige European leaders to face the issue head-on: they would be in a position to abandon the missiles through negotiation; if they did not--as in terms of their security interests they should not--their domestic critics would no longer be able to argue--as they do now--that American

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 60

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 61

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intransigence is the principal obstacle to arms control.


As for the United States it would of course participate in these deliberations--in a less dominant position--through its continued membership in the integrated command, its responsibility for nuclear defense, and its ground, naval and air force in Europe.

#### Redeployment

The issue of redeploying American forces touches raw European nerves like no other. The slightest hint of altering present arrangements jangles sensibilities; it evokes fears of American withdrawal and prospects of European neutralism. But if present trends continue it is certain to become a central issue in the Alliance relationship. Before dealing with it in the context of a program of NATO reform, a few generally recognized facts must be noted:

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 62

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 63

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
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A. The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation--to react to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. Massive retaliation, paradoxically required that the total forces on the Continent be kept below the level required for conventional defense. NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by doing anything to suggest that a Western response would be limited to non-nuclear means. Hence the American conventional deployment in Europe reflected political, not military, criteria: it was intended to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation and to leave no doubt in the Soviet mind that this would be the consequence of even a conventional war. The parallel European conventional forces represented a similar political decision: thus they, too, were conceived as a trip wire for our nuclear

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 64

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 65

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
riposte. From the birth of NATO a full conventional defense has been part neither of its strategy nor of its efforts.

B. This situation became anomalous when the growth of Soviet strategic forces deprived general nuclear war of much of its credibility. Yet NATO deployment has been essentially unaffected by the change of NATO doctrine to one of flexible response. NATO has improved its conventional defenses but has not closed the gap in conventional forces.

As the current NATO commander has made clear recently, NATO is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet ground attack for more than a few days, even counting the five American divisions which have remained in Europe for a generation. European ambivalence continues thirty-five years after NATO's creation. Our allies remain unwilling to develop forces strong enough to provide an alternative to nuclear weapons--and yet much of their

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 66

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 67

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
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public opinion shies away from even thinking about the concept of nuclear deterrence.

C. Were we to start all over again, we would therefore hardly repeat the decision of the Fifties in today's circumstances. Let us assume a group of wise men from both sides of the Atlantic were called together to plan a global strategy unconstrained by the past. Assume further that it started from the premise that ultimately the defense of the West is indivisible and that European security should be viewed under the aspect of the defense of the West in Europe--as a thoughtful French observer, Francoise de Rose put it. Such a group would almost surely conclude that the sensible division of responsibilities would be for Europe, possessing economic resources and manpower exceeding those of the Soviet Union, to concentrate on the conventional defense of their continent. To maintain the global balance of power--by definition, as essential for Europe as for America--the United States

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 68

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 69

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
would emphasize highly mobile conventional forces capable both of backing up Europe and contributing to the defense of, for example, the Middle East, or Asia or the Western Hemisphere.

Such a division of responsibility would also enable our military establishment to shift some of its intellectual energies and scientific research from a hypothetical esoteric war in an area where we have major allies to the defense of regions where conflict is much more likely, our allies are less prone to see their interests immediately engaged, and the countries being threatened are in a worse position to assist in the defense effort.

Even in the hypothetical case of starting all over again, an irrefutable case would exist for maintaining some considerable American ground forces in Europe. This would be essential to keep our allies from feeling abandoned and to eliminate any Soviet misunderstanding that the

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 70

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 71

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
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defense of Europe no longer reflects a vital American interest. In a new division of responsibilities we should also at least preserve and preferably strengthen the existing U.S. landbased airpower on the continent. And we should continue our responsibility for both strategic and tactical nuclear defense, assuming that we and the Europeans could agree on a strategy for the latter. American intermediate range missiles should remain in Europe to "couple" the nuclear defenses of both sides of the Atlantic so long as European leaders desired them. No change in naval deployments would be involved.

Why then is such a division of responsibilities not realized? Why is not a group of wise men assembled to tell us what is right? The principle obstacle is psychological. For all their criticisms of American policy, Europeans dread a return to isolationism. Americans fear that any tinkering with deployment would drive Europe into explicit neutralism. And some in the Pentagon prefer

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 72

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 73

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
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to maintain our divisions in Europe in a less than rational deployment rather than return some of them to the United States where they are more exposed to Congressional budget cutters.

The question remains whether an existing, historically based deployment that is losing any current rationale arrests or accelerates these attitudes. In my view, it will accelerate them. After all, pacifism and neutralism are on the march in Europe even under the present set-up; isolationism in America is not yet so vocal but is being powerfully encouraged by endless Allied disputes. An Alliance that cannot agree on strategic doctrine and arms control positions; an Alliance rent by increasingly frequent controversies over East-West and North-South relations cannot sustain itself by rigidly clinging to military arrangements decided a generation ago in totally different circumstances. With current trends the issue of the rationale for the NATO deployment will become

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 74  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 75

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
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unavoidable. If it arises not as an integral component in a comprehensive design of modernizing and strengthening the Alliance, but as a single question of whether to continue stationing American troops in Europe, unilateral changes will be arbitrarily imposed by the potentially most destructive means--the American budgetary process. Then indeed we might see in America a psychological wrench away from Europe and in Europe a panicky resentment against the United States. Withdrawal without a positive political and strategic purpose, withdrawal for its own sake, might indeed shock our allies into neutralism; it could mislead our adversary and tempt aggression. It is precisely my conviction that current trends make this outcome ultimately probably, that has impelled me to write this article.

There is an urgent need for a serious, frank and rapid reexamination of NATO doctrine, deployment and policies. It should be conducted by a high level group

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 76

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 77

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
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composed of men and women known for their dedication to Western unity. Obviously the group must begin with one of the most divisive issues before the Alliance: an agreement on the nature and the scope of the threat. In offering solutions it must learn from experience and avoid the pedantry that has marked previous such efforts when mountains of unread memoranda overwhelmed clear thought and abstract percentage goals were set which being either irrelevant or unachievable magnified the problem. A deadline for completion should be set--certainly no longer than two years.

Theoretically, such a study could lead to one of three outcomes: (a) the group could come to the same conclusions about the optimum division of responsibilities outlined above involving a strengthening of the European conventional component of NATO and a withdrawal of some American ground forces in the context of an agreed Alliance

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 78  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 79

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
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strategy. Given the disagreements about the nature of the interests involved in regions outside of Europe and the domestic priorities of most European countries such a conclusion however rational is extremely improbable.

(b) The group could argue that the strategic interests of the West require a full conventional defense but that for practical and psychological reasons Europe can undertake the required effort only if the present American ground deployment in Europe is maintained intact. (c) The group could decide that the realities of European domestic politics preclude more than the current gradualistic, marginal improvement of European defense efforts.

If Europe should in fact agree to build a full conventional defense and if it were prepared to express that commitment in unambiguous, agreed yearly obligations to increase its forces, the United States should accept the judgment that its present ground forces in Europe are an indispensable component--whatever contrary

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 80  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 81

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
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conclusions systems analysis might dictate. But if Europe should opt for a perpetuation of the present ambivalence and confusion--or for only a marginal improvement at its fringes--the United States will owe it to the sustainability of its strategy before our public and to the overall requirements of global defense to draw certain conclusions. When deployments reflect political, not security considerations, we will have no choice but to opt for a European deployment explicable to the American people. If nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent to even conventional attack, a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion (perhaps up to half) of our present ground forces would be a logical result. To provide time for necessary adjustments that withdrawal could be extended over a period of five years. To ease the transition further we could, if Europe agreed, keep the excess ground forces in Europe for an interim period afterward in a new status analogous to that of

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 82

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 83

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
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the French forces, prepared for use in Europe in support of European defense but also available for use in emergencies outside of Europe. Of course any withdrawal would make sense only if the redeployed forces were added to our strategic reserve; if they were disbanded the effect would be to weaken the overall defense.

The proposed redeployment would leave intact the air and naval forces as well as the deployment of intermediate range missiles so long as Europe wants them. A useful byproduct of the process would be a systematic reevaluation of the existing highly miscellaneous inventory of the very short-range tactical nuclear weapons--a legacy of three decades of ad hoc decisions--which now represent at one and the same time an increment to deterrence and the greatest danger of unintended nuclear war--because of the unpredictability of weapons deployed so far forward that they are unusually subject to the exigencies of battle.

In this scheme withdrawal would be not an end in itself--as it will if frustrations on both sides of

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 84  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 85

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
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the Atlantic go much further--but one component of a process extending over eight years that rededicates the United States to the Alliance for the indefinite future. It does so by putting before the American people a rational, hence sustainable strategy which takes account of changing circumstances.

Psychology is immensely important in international relations, especially when policies turn not only on cold, professional assessments of the national interest by trained political leaders, but crucially on public opinion and public attitudes. I would like to believe that once the initial shock inseparable from breaking with the familiar has worn off it would be seen that restructuring the alliance to place greater responsibility for European defense on Europeans is, not an abandonment of Europe; it is an embrace of Europe. It is a means of enlisting Europeans as full partners in the process of decision on which their safety as well as ours depends. It is

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 86

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 87

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
a move to take Europe and Europeans seriously, confident that together we will then approach jointly and constructively the requirements of our common defense. And we will be fulfilling the obligations of leadership by putting forward as an initiative what otherwise may well be imposed by necessity in much worse circumstances.

Political Objectives    --

By themselves, neither organizational nor doctrinal adaptations can remedy the political incoherence rending NATO. This article has emphasized security issues. However, a few general observations on the Alliances' political problems are necessary to place the security recommendations into perspective:

A. Those leaders on either side of the Atlantic who value the Alliance, with all its failings, as the ultimate guardian of Western freedom, must seek urgently to end the political disputes over East-West relations

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 88  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 89

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
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and general North-South policy and especially Western conduct in the flashpoints of conflict in the Third World. The tendency to grandstand before domestic audiences, the growing self-righteousness will in time make a mockery of the key assumption of the Atlantic Alliance: that we share a common approach to the problem of security. Defense requires after all some agreed political purpose in the name of which it is conducted--at a minimum an agreement on the nature of the threat.

B. The United States can not lead the Western alliance or even contribute to its cohesion if we do not restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy. Ever since the Vietnam war shattered our bipartisan unity in foreign policy we have disquieted our friends and confused, where we have not emboldened, our adversaries by periodic wide swings with respect to essential elements of our policies. As a nation we must accept the reality that the national interest does not change every four or eight years. At

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 90

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 91

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
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some point the national interest must be accepted by our public as clearly recognizable and constant. Otherwise, we shall become a source of dangerous instability, still relevant for our power but irrelevant for our ideas. A Presidential election year is probably not an ideal time to forge a bipartisan consensus. But whoever wins the Presidential election faces no more important and urgent challenge than to restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy.

C. European governments must meet head-on the disturbing trends toward pacifism and neutralism in their countries. These movements are led by men of conviction; they cannot be defused by accommodation. They can only be resisted with a compelling vision of a new future and not by insisting on the immutability of every existing arrangement, alternating with assaults on the transatlantic partner. If European governments feel obliged to defend what are perceived as largely American decisions; if they continue to humor

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 92  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 93

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
those who profess to see the danger to the peace in a bellicose America, not an intransigent Soviet Union, they will not be able to avoid being engulfed by a wave of abdication; they will make concession after concession, progressively becoming hostages of their critics.

The current condition of the Alliance cries out for a rethinking of its-structure, its doctrine and its unifying purposes. The creativity and courage with which we approach this challenge will depend whether the Alliance enters a new and dynamic period or gradually withers.

I have outlined proposals to reinvigorate allied cohesion by defining a clear set of responsibilities for each side of the Atlantic to be implemented gradually over a period of seven years. On that basis European leaders could defend cooperatin with the United States as something they sought as a matter of their own conviction and in their nation's interest. American leaders would

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 94

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 95

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
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have a rational, understandable policy to defend and they would benefit from dealing with a more equal partner. If the new arrangements are developed gradually and with sensitivity, mutual confidence can grow with each step. A new era of allied creativity and American dedication could give inspiration to the generation that has come to maturity since World War II, and since the postwar crises that gave birth to NATO and inspired its creators' generation with their sense of common purpose.

I have given long and careful thought to whether it is appropriate for a former Secretary of State to put forward such far-reaching proposals for the Alliance. In the end--appalled by the tone and nature of the transatlantic controversy--I came to the view that it would be better if the initiative were taken by a son of Europe clearly and deeply committed to Western unity rather than letting it pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 96  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 97

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
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neo-isolationists who systematiclaly seek to undermine  
all joint efforts.

The nations bordering the North Atlantic need above  
all faith in themselves and the will to resist the siren  
calls of those who use fear and panic as instruments  
of policy or of domestic debate. In the end we must  
fulfill our trust: to preserve and strengthen that North  
Atlantic Alliance which represents the hope of human  
dignity and decency in our world.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 98

**Image ID:** 15297810



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 99

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TIME ARTICLE


Just as storms recur in nature, crises recur in the Atlantic Alliance. Nearly every Administration for a generation has been involved in them.

However, the present turmoil in NATO has one crucial aspect which is both unprecedented and unsettling: in essence, disputes about policies are surrogates for a widening incompatibility of prevailing attitudes on the two sides of the Atlantic. This bodes ill for the future unless those attitudes can be changed.

Ironically, this comes at a time when the governments themselves are philosophically more compatible than they have been for a long while. NATO's day-to-day business is being conducted efficiently, without undue friction. Despite vocal protest demonstrations, American missiles are being deployed on schedule. Yet tensions are building beneath the surface.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 100

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 101

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
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A well-organized and financed "peace" movement in Europe has been pulling governments in the general direction of its policies despite the fact that those governments disagree with its premises. Because of this "peace" movement's sway over key segments of public opinion european leaders--even conservative ones-- have frequently yielded to the temptation to demonstrate their peaceful intentions the easy way, by pretending to be reining in a bellicose and insensitive United States. As a result among those who shape public attitudes--and thereby set what become the limits of the politically possible--there is less intellectual or philosophical agreement than in any previous period.

This creates an exceedingly dangerous situation. An alliance cannot endure without some basic agreement on the political aims which justify and give direction to the common effort. It cannot live by arms alone.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 102  
**Image ID:** 15297814



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 103

**Image ID:** 15297815

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3

If military arrangements provide its only bond, it will sooner or later disintegrate--especially if there is also disagreement about the nature of the military threat. That is the central issue before the Atlantic Alliance today. It requires a fundamental, even radical--in the literal sense, of going to the root--remedy.


\* \* \* \*

Among the problems now gnawing at the Alliance, four in particular stand out:

1. Lack of an agreed, credible strategy. The gap between NATO's formal strategy and what the public will support has widened dangerously. The so-called "flexible response" remains NATO's official doctrine. Devised in the 1960s, this contemplates a response to Soviet aggression that begins with conventional weapons and then goes up the ladder of nuclear escalation--reaching whatever level is necessary to halt Soviet

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 104

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 105

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
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aggression. The fatal weakness of this flexible response doctrine, in today's circumstances, derives from the fact that neither the existing nor the projected NATO conventional forces are adequate to repel a major Soviet conventional attack. Therefore, the doctrine would require a nuclear response at an early stage of a major conventional attack. Yet the present conditions of strategic nuclear parity deprive even the threat of strategic nuclear war of much of its credibility; mutual suicide cannot be made to appear as a rational option. Thus public opinion, essentially unopposed by the NATO governments, is moving powerfully against any use of nuclear weapons--even tactical nuclear weapons.

The Alliance is thereby trapped in a precarious combination of (a) inadequate conventional forces, leading to (b) reliance on nuclear weapons, in (c) a strategic environment that makes the threat of their use, and

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 106

**Image ID:** 15297818



Caption: "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 107

Image ID: 15297819

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therefore their deterrent value, less credible, and  
(d) a public climate of growing nuclear pacifism that  
undermines what credibility otherwise remains. Like  
the Soviet Union, the NATO countries have a huge stockpile  
of enormously destructive weapons. But the lack of  
a coherent defense policy leaves the Alliance, despite  
those weapons, disarming itself psychologically.


2. Intermediate range weapons and arms control.

When the first American intermediate range weapons arrived  
in Europe a few weeks ago, many in the Alliance celebrated  
the event as a great success. If the combination of  
public demonstrations and Soviet pressure had succeeded  
in blocking that deployment it would indeed have been  
a huge defeat. But without clarity about their purpose,  
the mere stationing of a small number of missiles is  
scarcely a victory.

For the basic European attitude toward the missiles  
remains that of a host toward a now unwanted guest

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 108

**Image ID:** 15297820



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 109

**Image ID:** 15297821


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whose previous invitation to dinner it would be too awkward to withdraw. Some prominent Europeans purport to see in the missiles' presence a hidden American design to confine a nuclear war to Europe. Others treat them as one of those peculiar American aberrations that periodically upset the Alliance's equilibrium. Too few recognize that in fact the missiles link the strategic nuclear defense of Europe and the United States, and even fewer are willing to admit it; they are a way of staking America's commitment, not a way to escape it.

In the prevailing atmosphere one popular recourse is to treat arms control negotiations as a way out, pressing these as a framework for the missiles' withdrawal, and thereby eroding the linkage between Europe's nuclear defense and ours. This inherent ambivalence makes it excruciatingly difficult to define "progress" toward an acceptable arms control agreement, while the nearly

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 110

**Image ID:** 15297822



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 111

**Image ID:** 15297823


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desperate eagerness with which "progress" is pursued makes its achievement less likely. The Soviets have refused even to discuss any proposal that would balance American intermediate range missiles in Europe against the existing much larger Soviet arsenal. The Soviet goal of leaving Europe vulnerable to Soviet blackmail is obvious. Yet significant segments of European opinion persist in blaming the United States for the deadlock. Both in Europe and in the United States, this attitude must erode the public support needed for both the missile deployment, and for coherent arms control.

3. East-West relations. Behind the sharp differences over defense strategy and arms control lies a parallel dispute over the posture the alliance should take toward the Soviet Union--a dispute which reflects sharp differences in assessments of the United States, as well as in attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Too many Europeans are convinced

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 112  
**Image ID:** 15297824



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 113

**Image ID:** 15297825


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that the United States is run by belligerent cowboys of the sort depicted in so many European (and Soviet) political cartoons, and that U.S. belligerence has provoked Soviet intransigence. Even the more conciliatory tone adopted recently by the United States has not changed this attitude. In short, Europeans on the whole consider the Soviet Union as tractable and somewhat misunderstood. Many Americans, on the other hand, are convinced that such European attitudes, together with the waves of pacifist and neutralist demonstrations, are naive and reflect a policy of appeasement. In this view European attitudes have encouraged a Soviet political offensive designed to manipulate Western public opinion and to exploit the divisions within the Alliance.

4. Relations with the Third World. Most Europeans believe that they now have a special opportunity to establish preferred relationships with countries in the Third

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 114

**Image ID:** 15297826



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 115

**Image ID:** 15297827


World. In the flashpoints of the Middle East, Africa and Central America, they consider U.S. approaches as hopelessly tainted by an obsession with Soviet ambitions; and some, whatever their own views, perceive an opening they can exploit in the Third World to their own advantage. In either case, they see gains for themselves in ostentatious dissociation from the United States. More than a few Americans view such European behavior either as a free ride paid for by U.S. sacrifices or as a positive incitement to Third World radicalism.

\* \* \* \*

These differences could be harmless and even healthy if eventually they produced compatible and constructive policies for the 1980s and '90s. So far this has not happened. Mutual recriminations have mounted, creating opportunities for Soviet political warfare even during this period of stagnation in the Kremlin leadership.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 116

**Image ID:** 15297828



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 117


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The Politburo is obviously convinced that the West has become so paralyzed with respect to nuclear weapons that there is no urgency about nuclear arms control; it can simply wait for a while to harvest the fruits of Western anxieties. By contrast, there may be some concern in Moscow that NATO will move to close the gap in conventional forces; hence the willingness to talk about limiting conventional arms, which could place obstacles in the way of the desperately needed Western conventional build-up with the argument that a conventional build-up weakens prospects for arms control. Meanwhile Soviet arms continue streaming into Third World trouble spots everywhere from the Middle East to the Caribbean. The present psychological weakness of the West was symbolized dramatically at the current European Security Conference in Stockholm. Less than six months after the shooting-down of the Korean airliner, a little more than two

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 118  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 119

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
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years after the imposition of martial law in Poland,  
/exactly  
almost four years after Afghanistan and at a meeting  
where the Soviet foreign minister viciously attacked  
the U.S., every single NATO foreign minister who could  
get an appointment called on Mr. Gromyko holding court  
at the Soviet embassy. In short, Europe is not moderating  
the United States, and the United States is not stiffening  
Europe's spine, as the folklore would have it. Each  
side of the Atlantic paralyzes and demoralizes the other.

This state of NATO affairs has proceeded too far  
to be blamed on particular policies or specific actions  
on either side. The trouble lies deeper. With respect  
to some issues, the fact seems to be--to put it delicately--  
that a community of interests can no longer be taken  
for granted. And even where the common interest is  
evident, as it is in the defense field, the existing  
structure is simply not working, either in achieving  
a definition of the threat or of methods to meet it.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 120

**Image ID:** 15297832



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 121


**Image ID:** 15297833

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Existing arrangements are unbalanced; they encourage a sort of de facto neutralism in Europe and unilateralism in the United States.

When one country dominates the alliance on all major issues--when that one country chooses weapons and decides deployments, when it conducts the arms control negotiations, sets the tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the framework for relations with the Third World--little incentive remains for a serious joint effort at defining the terms for European security or even for coordinating a serious set of foreign policies. Such joint efforts entail sacrifices and carry political costs. Leaders are not likely to make the sacrifice or pay the cost unless they feel responsible for the results. An imbalance such as the one now existing cannot be made up for by "consultation," however meticulous. In the long run, consultation works only when those

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 122  
**Image ID:** 15297834



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 123

**Image ID:** 15297835


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being consulted have an alternative and a capacity for independent action. Then each side takes the other seriously; then each side knows that the other's consent has to be won. Then each has an incentive to be responsible. Otherwise consultation becomes "briefing". Agreement reflects not conviction but acquiescence for want of an alternative.

The present imbalance is not new. It has existed ever since World War II. But dependence on another nation has a cumulative impact. When the feeling of impotence no longer results from an unavoidable necessity but from a policy choice, it becomes destructive. In Europe's case, the harm is compounded by European prosperity: against that economic background, continued military dependence on the United States breeds a combination of guilt, self-hatred, and a compulsion to display independence of the United States wherever doing so

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 124

**Image ID:** 15297836



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 125

**Image ID:** 15297837


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is possible and safe, especially with regard to some Third World issues and certain aspects of East-West relations.

The problem has become even more acute because the generation of leaders that built NATO has virtually disappeared. Those who led Europe during those early postwar years were still psychologically of the era when Europe bestrode the world. Global thinking came naturally. European leaders assumed responsibility for their own nations' security policies as a matter of tradition, and gave it up only reluctantly because of special postwar circumstances. But nearly forty years have passed now since the end of World War II. The new generation of leaders was reared in an era when the United States was preeminent. Sheltered by the same alliance which is under assault by their publics, they take it for granted that they can delegate the military defense of Europe to us. For the rest, too

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 126

**Image ID:** 15297838



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 127

**Image ID:** 15297839


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many of them seek to position themselves somewhere between the superpowers--the first step toward psychological neutralism. Thus the European schizophrenia: a fear that the United States might not be prepared to risk its own population on a nuclear defense of Europe, coupled simultaneously with the anxiety that America might drag Europe into an unwanted conflict by its clumsy handling of Third World issues or East-West relations.

The rush to condemn our actions in Grenada by so many of our European allies is a case in point. What could have been in the minds of those leaders who authorized the UN votes or pronounced themselves on the subject? Even making allowance--especially in the case of Britain--for totally inadequate consultation, and whatever their view of the wisdom or necessity of our actions, they could hardly have wanted us to fail. That would surely have affected our willingness to run risks in defense

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 128

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 129

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
of other areas--ultimately including even Europe. Rather, they must have assumed that their actions were irrelevant and costless: that we would not be deterred, that we would exact no penalty, and that therefore it was safe to use the incident to score a few points with "progressive" constituencies at home and with Third World radicals abroad. Needless to say this attitude was deeply resented in the United States.

The change in the nature of European leadership has been paralleled in the United States. Our new elites do not reject NATO any more than do their European counterparts. But for them, too, the alliance is more a practical than an emotional necessity.

On both sides of the Atlantic, we thus find ourselves threatened by the dominance of considerations of domestic politics over global political strategy. In Europe this leads to a faintly disguised neutralism. In the United States it accelerates our already strong tendency

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 130

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 131

**Image ID:** 15297843

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
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toward unilateralism and isolationism.

U.S. leaders have too often adjusted foreign policies to political pressures, bureaucratic infighting, or changing intellectual fashions. The history of the American attitude toward intermediate range missiles in Europe is a case in point. These were proposed to the Europeans in 1958, installed in Italy and Turkey in 1960 and withdrawn in 1962. They then reappeared in 1963 as part of a so-called NATO multilateral force, and were abandoned once again in 1965. They were put before NATO for the third time in 1978 and then embodied in the current "double track" decision in 1979. Not surprisingly, those Europeans organizing to stop the current deployment are encouraged by their knowledge that previous American decisions have not proved immutable.

Similarly, in a matter of months, our allies have had to adjust from passionate U.S. advocacy of SALT II

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 132  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 133

**Image ID:** 15297845


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to its rejection, and then to the fact that we are observing a treaty we refuse to ratify, from a strategic doctrine of massive retaliation to flexible response, from a policy of detente to a policy of confrontation and back again to a policy of conciliation--all in addition to the reassessments that in the past decade have occurred automatically whenever a new administration comes into office. Each change of course leaves victims among European leaders who have staked their domestic positions on policies which the United States later abandons. Each lurch encourages a kind of neutralism, as Europeans seek to avoid being made hostage to sudden swings in American policy.

A continuation of existing trends is bound to lead first to stagnation and in time to the disintegration of the Western Alliance. An explicit act of statesmanship is needed to give new meaning to Western unity and a

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 134

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
new vitality to NATO. In my view this must have three components: (a) a more significant role for Europe within NATO, (b) a reform of the NATO organization and (c) a reassessment of current NATO deployment.

I shall discuss these in turn.

#### A New Role for Europe

During the entire post-World War II period it has been an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a strong, united Europe was an essential component of the Atlantic partnership. We have applied that principle with dedication and imagination--in so far as it depended on American actions--in all areas except security. With respect to defense, however, the United States has been indifferent at best--at least since the failure of the European Defense Community--to any sort of Europeanization. Many in this country seemed to fear that a militarily unified Europe might

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 136  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 137

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give less emphasis to transatlantic relations.


The opposite is almost certainly the case.

In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination.

What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its external barriers are higher than its internal ones.

In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation with the United States. A Europe analyzing its security needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find association with the United States advantageous. Greater European unity in defense would also help to overcome the looming logistical nightmare in which every European nation seeks to stretch its already inadequate defense effort across the whole panoply of modern weapons. For example, there are five kinds of battle tanks within NATO, different types of artillery and different standards

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 138  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 139

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
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for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires Europe to develop a greater identity and a more distinctly European coherence in the field of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burdensharing," of paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind something more structural--a more rational balance of responsibilities between the two sides of the Atlantic. My basic reason for proposing this is not that the financial burdens are unfairly distributed--although they are. Rather the present allocation of responsibilities makes no sense. It fails to bring the allies to reflect naturally about the nature of security and the purposes of Allied diplomacy. Neither side of the Atlantic has by itself sufficient incentive for a long-range objective study of the real choices posed by the new situation. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing it

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 140

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 141

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lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise. But since drift will surely lead to unraveling--if more imperceptibly --statesmanship impels a new approach.

#### Structural Reform


To be sure, structural reform cannot substitute for a sense of purpose and clear doctrine. All reorganization can do is to provide an incentive for shared political purposes. That incentive in my view exists only if European judgments on security and East-West diplomacy (and other matters) emerge from Europe's own analysis, rather than as acquiescence in American decisions, briefings, and pressures.

Specifically:

1. By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for the conventional ground defense. This is well within the capability of a continent with nearly one and one half times the population and twice the GNP of the

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 142

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 143

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
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Soviet Union, which moreover has to divide its forces on two fronts.

2. To reflect the new responsibilities, a European officer should by then take the traditionally American place as "Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe " (SACEUR), probably with a U.S. deputy. Such a change is also likely to give a new perspective to Allied strategic planning. The United States has generally achieved its military successes by the weight of equipment which our superior industrial potential made available. This has tempted our military leaders to equate strategy with logistics. European nations have rarely enjoyed such a margin of material superiority; they have had to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics--precisely what NATO needs in an age of nuclear parity and renewed emphasis on conventional defense.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 144

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 145

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
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3. Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary General--the official responsible for running the political machinery of NATO--has been European. In the new structure it would make more sense for the Secretary General to be American--whenever the new Secretary General, Lord Carrington, decides to retire. This would reflect the new emphasis on political coordination on both sides of the Atlantic. In the meantime, there is no Western leader better qualified for guiding NATO's transition than the wise and able new Secretary General.

4. Europe should take over those arms control negotiations that directly affect its security. The INF negotiations with the Soviets (dealing with intermediate range missiles) and the MBFR negotiations (dealing with ground forces) have heretofore been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a European chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though predominantly

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 146

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 147

**Image ID:** 15297859


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European, delegation.

The structure I propose would create an incentive for Europeans on their own initiative and on their own terms to confront a whole series of issues that have been evaded for at least two decades: the precise definition of conventional defense; the nature of the so-called nuclear threshold--the point where this is no choice except conventional defeat or nuclear escalation; the relationship between strategy and arms control. Under a European SACEUR the temptation of European leaders to justify sacrifices as a response to American pressure will be reduced. Since nuclear weapons would presumably be used only if conventional defense fails, Europe would bear the responsibility for setting the nuclear threshold by its own efforts; it could relieve its nuclear anxieties by the simple expedient of increasing its conventional defenses. And if it did not, increased reliance on

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 148  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 149

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
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American nuclear guarantees and deployments would clearly be Europe's own choice.

By the same token, European leadership in the MBFR and INF negotiations would place the final responsibility for both conventional force levels and the intermediate range missile deployment with the leaders whose countries will have to bear the brunt--for good or ill--of the outcome of these negotiations. That is particularly true with respect to the stationing of American intermediate range missiles in Europe. That move makes sense only if it is perceived as linking the nuclear defenses of Europe and the United States; if in other words it is believed that they help deter a Soviet conventional attack by increasing the prospect of a nuclear blow from Europe on Soviet territory. If our principal allies do not share this conviction--if they indulge the absurd suspicion that American missiles capable of reaching

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 150

**Image ID:** 15297862



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 151

**Image ID:** 15297863


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the Soviet Union are a subterfuge to confine such a war to Europe or if they agree to these missiles only as a price paid for our general commitment to European defense, then sooner or later the psychological basis for the current deployment will evaporate.

European chairmanship of the INF negotiations would oblige European leaders to face the issue head-on: they could abandon the missiles through negotiation; if they did not--as they should not--their domestic critics would no longer be able to argue--as they do now--that American intransigence is the principal obstacle to arms control. As for the United States it would of course participate in these deliberations--in a less dominant position--through its continued membership in the integrated command, its responsibility for nuclear defense, and its ground, naval and air force in Europe.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 152

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 153

**Image ID:** 15297865

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
### Redployment

Nothing touches raw European nerves like the slightest hint of altering the present American deployment in Europe. But it is a central issue in the Alliance relationship. Before dealing with it in the context of this program of NATO reform, a few recognized facts must be noted:

A. The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation--to react to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. Massive retaliation, paradoxically required that the total forces on the Continent be kept below the level required for conventional defense. NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by doing anything to suggest that a Western response would be limited to non-nuclear means. Hence the American conventional deployment in Europe reflected

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 154

**Image ID:** 15297866



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 155


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political, not military, criteria: it was intended to be large enough to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation and to leave no doubt in the Soviet mind that this would be the consequence of even a conventional war. And the European conventional forces in turn were originally designed as a trip wire. From the birth of NATO a full conventional defense has been neither part of its strategy nor of its efforts.

B. This situation became anomalous when the huge growth of Soviet strategic forces brought about parity and deprived general nuclear war of credibility. Yet NATO deployment has not fundamentally changed even when NATO doctrine was changed to flexible response. NATO has improved its conventional defenses without closing the gap in conventional forces. As the current NATO commander has made clear recently, NATO is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet ground attack for more than

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 156  
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Caption: "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 157

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
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a few days, even counting the five American divisions which have remained in Europe for a generation. European ambivalence continues thirty-five years after NATO's creation. Our allies remain unwilling to develop forces strong enough to provide an ultimate alternative to the American nuclear deterrent (while much of their public opinion shies away from even thinking about the concept of nuclear deterrence.)

C. Were we to start all over again, we would therefore in today's circumstances. hardly repeat the decision of the Fifties. Were a group of wise men on both sides of the Atlantic to plan a global strategy unconstrained by the past it would almost surely conclude that the sensible division of responsibilities would be for Europe, possessing economic resources and manpower exceeding those of the Soviet Union, to concentrate on the conventional defense of their continent. To maintain the global balance of power--as essential for Europe as for America--the United States would emphasize

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 158

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 159

**Image ID:** 15297871

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
highly mobile conventional forces capable both of backing up Europe and contributing to the defense of, for example, the Middle East, or Asia or the Western Hemisphere.

Such a division of responsibility would also enable our military establishment to shift some of its intellectual energies and scientific research from a hypothetical esoteric war in an area where we have major allies to the defense of regions where conflict is much more likely, our allies are less prone to see their interests as ours, and the countries being threatened are in a worse position to assist in the defense effort.

In such a rearrangement we would maintain our present European deployment if and only if these precise numbers made the difference that enabled Europe to have a truly adequate conventional defense against any foreseeable level of Soviet aggression.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 160

**Image ID:** 15297872




**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 161

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Even in the hypotehtical case of starting all over again, an irrefutable case would exist for maintaining some considerable American ground forces in Europe. This would be essential to keep our allies from feeling abandoned and to eliminate any Soviet misunderstanding that the defense or Europe no longer reflects a vital American interest. In a new division of responsibilities we should also at least preserve and preferably strengthen the existing U.S. landbased airpower on the continent. And we should continue our responsibility for both strategic and tactical nuclear defense, assuming that we and the Europeans could agree on a strategy for the latter. American intermediate range missiles should remain in Europe to "couple" the nuclear defenses of both sides of the Atlantic so long as European leaders desired them. No change in naval deployments would be involved.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 162  
**Image ID:** 15297874



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 163


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Why then is such a division of responsibilities not realized? Why not a group of wise men to tell us what is right? The principal obstacle is psychological. For all their criticisms of American policy, Europeans dread a return to isolationism. Americans fear that any tinkering with deployment will drive Europe into explicit neutralism. The question remains whether a deployment that is losing any rationale arrests or accelerates these attitudes. In my view, it will accelerate them. After all pacifism and neutralism are on the march in Europe even under the present set-up; isolationism in America is not yet so vocal but is being powerfully provoked by endless Allied disputes. An Alliance that cannot agree on strategic doctrine and arms control positions; an Alliance rent by increasingly frequent controversies over East-West and North-South relations cannot sustain itself by rigidly clinging to military

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 164  
**Image ID:** 15297876



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 165


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arrangements decided a generation ago in totally different circumstances. Sooner rather than later the issue will be unavoidable. If it arises not as an integral part in an over-all design of modernizing the Alliance, but as a single question of whether to continue stationing American troops in Europe, unilateral changes will be arbitrarily imposed by the potentially most destructive means--the American budgetary process. Then indeed we might see in America a psychological wrench away from Europe and a panicky resentment in Europe against the United States. Withdrawal without a positive political and strategic purpose, withdrawal for its own sake, might indeed shock our allies into neutralism; it could mislead our adversary and tempt aggression. It is precisely my conviction that current trends make this outcome nearly inevitable, that has impelled me to write this article.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 166

**Image ID:** 15297878




**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 167

**Image ID:** 15297879

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There is an urgent need for a serious, frank and rapid reexamination of NATO doctrine as an integral part of a comprehensive redesign of the NATO structure. It should be conducted by a high level group known for its dedication to Western unity. It must learn from experience and avoid the pedantry that has marked bureaucratic efforts when mountains of unread memoranda overwhelmed clear thought and abstract percentage goals were set which being either irrelevant or unachievable, magnified the problem. A deadline for completion should be set--certainly no longer than two years. That study cannot draw meaningful conclusions unless there is a prior agreement on the nature of the threat. If the outcome should produce clear goals for a full conventional defense, expressed in unambiguous yearly obligations and if it should conclude that the present American deployment is an indispensable component, we would have

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 168  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 169

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
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no reason to alter it and a basis for defending it against the inevitable critics.

But the political realities of European domestic priorities make such a conclusion unlikely. Europe is likely to opt for a low-confidence defense, relying ultimately on the nuclear deterrent and it will justify its view by downgrading the Soviet threat. In that case a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion (perhaps up to half) of our present ground forces would become inevitable. To provide time for necessary adjustments that withdrawal should be gradual over a period of five years and should not exceed more than half of the existing units. It would leave intact the air and naval forces as well as the deployment of intermediate range missiles. A useful byproduct of the process would be a systematic reevaluation of the existing highly miscellaneous inventory of the very short-range tactical nuclear weapons--a

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 170

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 171

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
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legacy of three decades of ad hoc decisions--which now represent both an increment to deterrence and the greatest danger of unintended nuclear war. Ideally, the levels of redeployment would not be unilateral decisions but emerge from the study proposed earlier.

In this scheme withdrawal would be not an end in itself--as it will if frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic go much further--but one component of a process that commits the United States for the indefinite future to a rational, hence sustainable, global strategy. To ease the transition we could, if Europe agreed, keep the excess ground forces in Europe for an interim period in a new status analogous to that of the French forces, prepared for use in Europe in support of European defense but also available for use in emergencies outside of Europe. At the same time we would commit ourselves to maintain all of the remaining forces under the NATO

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 172

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Caption: "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 173

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command indefinitely.


#### Political Objectives

By themselves, neither organizational nor doctrinal adaptations can remedy the political incoherence rending NATO. This article has emphasized security issues.

However, a few general observations on the Alliances' political problems are necessary to place the security recommendations into perspective:

A. Those leaders on either side of the Atlantic who, with all its failings, value the Alliance as the ultimate guardian of Western freedom, must seek urgently to end the political disputes over East-West relations and North-South policy. The tendency to grandstand before domestic audiences, the growing self-righteousness will in time undermine even the security element of substance. Defense requires after all some common political purpose in the name of which it is conducted--

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 174  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 175

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
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at a minimum an agreement on the nature of the threat.

B. The United States can not lead the Western alliance or even contribute to its cohesion if we do not restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy. Ever since the Vietnam war shattered our bipartisan unity in foreign policy we have disquieted our friends and confused, where we have not emboldened, our adversaries by periodic wide swings in the essential elements of our policies. We must accept the proposition that the national interest does not change every four or eight years. At some point the national interest must be accepted by our public as clearly recognizable and constant. Otherwise, we shall become a source of dangerous instability, still relevant for our power but irrelevant for our ideas. A Presidential election year is probably not an ideal time to forge a bipartisan consensus. But whoever wins the Presidential election faces no more

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 176

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 177

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
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important and urgent challenge than to restore  
bipartisanship to our foreign policy.

C. European governments must meet head-on the  
disturbing trends toward pacifism and neutralism in  
their countries. These movements are led by men of  
conviction; they cannot be defused by accommodation.  
They can only be resisted with a compelling vision of  
a new future and not by insisting on the momentum of  
existing institutions, alternating with assaults on  
the transatlantic partner. If European governments  
feel obliged to defend what are perceived as largely  
American decisions; if they continue to humor the apostles  
of a bellicose America allegedly in need of their balancing  
ministrations, they will sooner or later be engulfed  
by a wave of abdication; they will make concession after  
concession, progressively becoming hostages of their  
critics. If they are either unable or unwilling to

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 178

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 179

**Image ID:** 15297891

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
do so, the Western will will gradually wither.

#### Conclusion

I have given long and careful thought to whether it is appropriate for a former Secretary of State to put forward such far-reaching proposals for the alliance. In the end--appalled by the tone and nature of the transatlantic controversy--I came to the view that it would be better if the initiative were taken by a son of Europe clearly and deeply committed to Western unity rather than letting it pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and neo-isolationists who systematically seek to undermine all joint efforts.

The current condition cries out for a rethinking of the Alliance. Our only choice is whether we bring it about through creative leadership or whether we are driven to it in response to a series of crises and defeats. On this will depend whether the Alliance is revitalized

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 180  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 181

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
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or withered. It seems to me far better to launch now on a positive basis a debate which will become inevitable as the decade proceeds.

I have outlined proposals to reinvigorate allied cohesion by defining a clear set of responsibilities for each side of the Atlantic. On that basis European leaders could defend cooperation with the United States as something they sought as a matter of their own conviction and in their nation's interest. American leaders would have a rational, understandable policy to defend and they would benefit from dealing with a more equal partner. If the new arrangements are developed gradually and with sensitivity, mutual confidence can grow with each step. A new era of allied creativity and American dedication could give inspiration to a new generation that has come to maturity since World War II, and since the postwar crises that gave birth

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 182  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 183

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
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to NATO and inspired its creators' generation with their sense of common purpose.

The nations bordering the North Atlantic need above all faith in themselves and the will to resist the siren calls of those who use fear and panic as instruments of policy or of domestic debate. In the end we must fulfill our trust: to preserve and strengthen that North Atlantic Alliance which represents the hope of human dignity and decency in our world.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 184

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
TIME ARTICLE

In recent months it has become obvious that the Atlantic Alliance is going through one of its periodic crises. In itself that is not unusual. Transatlantic disputes have occurred in nearly every Administration--with the possible exception of that of President Ford--for a generation. There is however, this unprecedented aspect to the current malaise: Its essence is not a dispute between governments but a growing estrangement of peoples and attitudes on the two sides of the Atlantic. The governments in fact hold more compatible views than has been the case in a long time. The day-to-day business is being conducted in an efficient manner and without visible signs of friction. American missiles are being deployed despite large protest demonstrations.

Yet beneath the surface, tensions are building; there is less intellectual or philosophical agreement than at any previous period. A vocal and well organized "peace" movement in Europe pulls governments in the general direction of its policies even

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 186

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 187


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while these governments privately disagree with the premises. European leaders--especially in the Federal Republic, Scandinavia and the Low countries and lately even in Great Britain to a more limited extent--have felt obliged to demonstrate their peaceful intentions and been tempted to do this by pretending that they are moderating a bellicose and insensitive United States. Europe is confused about the function of American intermediate range weapons; it disagrees with what it chooses to consider the confrontational style of the Administration--a preconception, which recent changes of our tone have not yet altered; and it has missed few opportunities to dissociate from the American approach to the developing countries which is being criticized for its alleged obsession with the Soviet menace. An Alliance cannot survive indefinitely without some agreement on political aims; military arrangements cannot provide its only bond--especially when there is disagreement as well about the

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 188  
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Caption: "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 189

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
nature of the threat. That is the issue before the Atlantic Alliance today.

Four particular problems are gnawing at the Atlantic Alliance.

The lack of an agreed strategy. The gap between formal NATO strategy and what the public will support is becoming dangerous. Official NATO doctrine remains the so-called flexible response devised in the '60s which beginning with conventional weapons requires going up the ladder of nuclear escalation until Soviet aggression is halted. Since existing and projected conventional forces are clearly inadequate to repel a major Soviet conventional attack, strategic reality makes the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe inevitable. But public opinion is moving powerfully against nuclear weapons, essentially unopposed by governments. The Alliance is thus left with a precarious and anomalous combination of (a) reliance on nuclear weapons, (b) conditions of strategic

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 190

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 191

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
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parity which deprives nuclear weapons of a rational objective, (c) growing nuclear pacifism and (d) conventional forces, which are inadequate in size and further weakened by the lack of standardization. The absence of a coherent defense policy produces the paradoxical combination of an Alliance disarming itself psychologically at the very time it possesses the most destructive stockpile of weapons the world has ever seen.

Arms control and Intermediate Range Weapons. When the first American intermediate range missiles arrived in Europe a few weeks ago many in the Alliance celebrated a great success. To be sure, if massive demonstrations and Soviet pressure had succeeded in blocking that deployment it would have been a huge defeat. But in the absence of clarity about their purpose the mere stationing of a small number of missiles is far from a victory. For the basic European attitude towards the missiles continues to be

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 192  
**Image ID:** 15297904



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 193

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
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that of a host toward an unwanted visitor whose invitation to dinner it would be too embarrassing to withdraw. Some eminent Europeans see in those weapons a hidden American design to confine a nuclear war to Europe; others treat them as one of those inexplicable American fads that upset the Alliance's equilibrium at periodic intervals. Too few recognize, and even fewer are willing to admit, that those weapons link the strategic nuclear defense of Europe and the United States. Arms control negotiations are seen as a way out; they are pressed to provide a framework for withdrawal. But the absence of an agreed doctrine for defense makes it excruciatingly difficult to measure progress. And the nearly desperate eagerness with which that progress is pursued militates against success. The Soviets have refused even to discuss any proposal that would balance American intermediate range missiles in Europe against the comparable Soviet arsenal. Even while the Soviet goal is transparent: to leave Europe

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 194

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 195

**Image ID:** 15297907


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subject to nuclear blackmail, significant segments of European opinion blame the United States for the deadlock. This must sooner or later erode in Europe as well as in the United States the basis both for coherent arms control and for the missile deployment.

The Issue of East-West Relations. The division over strategy and arms control is replicated--indeed caused by-- differences over the attitude towards the Soviet Union. Too many Europeans are convinced that America is run by belligerent cowboys who have provoked a Soviet intransigence that even a recently more conciliatory tone has proved incapable of moderating. Too many Americans are convinced that such attitudes coupled with pacifist and neutralist demonstrations have encouraged the current Soviet political offensive to manipulate Western public opinion and to exploit the divisions within the Alliance.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 196

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 197

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
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The Issue of Relations with the Developing World. Most Europeans are convinced that they have a special opportunity to establish a preferred relationship in the so-called Third World. They see in dissociation from the United States a positive advantage; they consider our attitudes hopelessly blighted by anti-Soviet obsessions. Quite a few Americans treat the European behavior as a free ride on our sacrifices or as an incitement to radical conduct.

These disputes might be beneficial if somewhere along the line they led to some agreement. So far this has not happened; recriminations mount and create opportunities for Soviet diplomacy even during a period of stagnation in the Kremlin leadership. The Politburo obviously is convinced that Western paralysis with respect to nuclear weapons has reached a point where there is no urgency about nuclear arms control; it can wait for a while to harvest Western anxieties. At the same time there may be some concern

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 198

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 199

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
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in Moscow that we might move to close the gap in conventional forces; hence the willingness to talk about conventional arms limits which provide an obstacle to a conventional build-up. The debate about who is to blame for the East-West impasse ended at Stockholm with all NATO delegations that could get an appointment calling on Mr. Gromyko at the Soviet embassy--less than six months after the shootingdown of the Korean airliner, a little more than two years after martial law in Poland. And all the while Soviets arms are streaming into Third World trouble spots from the Middle East to the Caribbean. Europe is not moderating America and America is not stiffening Europe's spine, as the folklore has it. The debate paralyses each side of the Atlantic.

This state of affairs has gone on for too long to be ascribed to particular policies or specific errors--on either side of the Atlantic. The fact seems to be that with respect to some issues a community of interests can

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 200

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 201


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no longer be taken for granted, to put it mildly. And where the common interest is fairly evident as in the defense field, the existing structure is simply not working adequately. Existing arrangements are unbalanced; they encourage unilateralism in America and a kind of de facto neutralism in Europe.

When all major issues are thoroughly dominated by one country, which chooses weapons and decides deployments, conducts arms control negotiations, sets the tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the framework for relations with the Third World, little incentive remains for a serious European security or even foreign policy. This imbalance cannot be made up by "consultation," however meticulous. For that nostrum which is so frequently invoked can amount to a veto only if one is willing to face paralysis and if a veto is not granted, bad feelings are inevitable. In any event, consultations function in the long run only if the interlocutor is thought to have an alternative and a

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 202  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 203

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
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capacity for independent action. That will cause each side to take the other seriously. It avoids the sense of impotence which results when advice is ignored. If there is no capacity for autonomous action, there is little incentive for responsibility on either side. Consultation, thus, too often amounts to little more than briefings and our allies' agreement reflects acquiescence for want of an alternative more than real conviction.

This state of affairs is not new; it has persisted throughout the postwar period. But the impact of dependence on another country is cumulative. The sense of impotence becomes destructive when it turns from a necessity into a policy choice. Incongruous as it is with Europe's economic recovery, it breeds a combination of guilty feelings, self-hatred and a need to vindicate one's independence towards America on non-central issues--a declaration of independence verging on neutralism with respect to Third World issues and some aspects of East-West relations.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 204

**Image ID:** 15297916



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 205

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
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The problem has become the more acute because the generation of leaders who built NATO has virtually disappeared. The postwar leaders of Europe were more secure than the present crop; more used to conducting global foreign policies. Brought up when Europe was still at the center of world affairs they considered it natural to assume responsibility for their own foreign policies, and they felt less need to prove their status either to themselves or to their publics. The new leaders nurtured in an era when America was preeminent and sheltered by an Alliance under assault by much of their public, delegate their security problems to us; for the rest they seek to position themselves somewhere between the superpowers--the first step towards psychological neutralism. Thus the European schizophrenia: a simultaneous fear that the United States might not be prepared to risk its population on a nuclear defense of Europe, coupled with the anxiety that America might drag Europe into an unwanted conflict by its clumsy handling of Third World issues or

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 206

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Caption: "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 207

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
East-West relations.

The condemnation of our actions in Grenada by so many of our European allies is a case in point. What could have been in the minds of the leaders who authorized the UN votes or pronounced themselves on the subject, have been thinking? Whatever their view of the wisdom and necessity of our actions and even making allowance, especially in the case of Britain for totally inadequate consultation, they could hardly have wanted us to fail because this would have surely affected our willingness to run risks in defense of other areas-- including ultimately even Europe. They must have assumed that their actions were irrelevant and costless; that we would not be deterred; that we would exact no penalty and that therefore it was safe to use the incident to score a few points with "progressive" constituencies at home and Third World radicals abroad.

The change in the nature of European leadership

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 208

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 209

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
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has been paralleled in the United States by a transfer of power from the Eastern establishment to new elites in the West and Southwest. They do not reject NATO any more than do their European colleagues. But for them it is more a practical reality than an emotional necessity. In short, we are in danger of a growing provincialism on both sides of the Atlantic. Where in Europe this involves a slightly disguised neutralism, in America it accelerates trends towards unilateralism--the tendency to act without adequate consideration of the intangibles of the views of our allies. Accustomed for thirty years to getting their way, our leaders too often have adjusted foreign policies to domestic considerations, bureaucratic infighting, or changing intellectual fashions. The history of the American attitude towards intermediate range missiles in Europe is a case in point. They were proposed to the Europeans in 1958, installed in Italy and Turkey in 1960 and withdrawn in 1962; they reappeared

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 210

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 211


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in 1963 as a so-called NATO multilateral force and were abandoned once again in 1965. They were put before NATO again in 1978 and embodied in the current so-called "double track" decision in 1979. Those Europeans seeking to end the current deployment knew at a minimum that previous American decisions have not been immutable. Similarly, in a matter of months, our allies have had to adjust from passionate U.S. advocacy of SALT II to its rejection, from a strategic doctrine of massive retaliation to flexible response (of which Europeans learned later the Presidents concerned did not intend to carry out the essential nuclear part), from a policy of detente to a policy of confrontation and back again to a policy of conciliation--in addition to the reassessments that seem to occur automatically when a new Administration comes into office. Each change of course leaves victims among European leaders who had staked their domestic position on policies which we have later

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 212

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 213

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
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abandoned; each lurch encourages a kind of neutralism that seeks to avoid being made hostage to sudden lurches in American policy.

Ironically, both European neutralism and American unilateralism are nourished by the same conviction: that the Alliance will survive these tendencies. Deep down Europeans count on being defended by us, and Americans would not change policies and doctrines so readily were we not convinced that in the end our allies will have no choice except to go along. And both in the end will prove to be wrong if there is not a deliberate and systematic effort to reverse these trends.

The time has come for the Alliance to return to first principles. During the entire postwar period it has been an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a strong, united Europe was an essential component of Atlantic partnership. We have applied that

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 214  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 215

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
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principle with dedication and imagination--in so far as it depended on American actions--in all areas except security. With respect to defense the United States has on the whole been at best indifferent to any Europeanization of the defense effort--at least after the failure of the European defense community--apparently on the theory that a militarily unified Europe might give less emphasis to Atlantic relations.

It is a mistake of potentially historic consequence. In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to competition and a degree of discrimination. What defines a Common Market after all is that its external barriers are higher than its internal ones. In the field of defense, by contrast, greater increased European responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation with the United States. It is almost impossible to conceive circumstances in which a Europe looking after its own security in a rational manner would not find association with the United States advantageous.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 216

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 217

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Indeed, I would argue that the perpetuation of the current imbalanced relationship is far more likely to accelerate European neturalism.

Moreover, the present fragmentation of Europe makes a coherent defense strategy nearly impossible within the existing framework--especially in the conventional field. There are five battletanks within NATO; different types of artillery and different standards for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. Any extended conventional battle in Europe would turn into a logistical nightmare.


#### Structural Reform

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires Europe to develop a greater identity and coherence in the field of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burdensharing," of paying more for the existing effort.

I have in mind something more structural--a rational division of labor between the two sides of the Atlantic. My basic

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 218

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 219

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
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reason for proposing this is not that the financial burdens are unfairly distributed--although they are. Rather the present allocation of responsibilities makes no sense and yet it cannot change under present conditions because everyone is afraid to take the initiative in doing so, lest it unravel the whole enterprise. The existing structure fails to bring the allies to reflect naturally and responsibly about the nature of security and the purposes of Allied diplomacy. Neither side of the Atlantic has sufficient incentive for a long-range objective study of the real choices.

To be sure, structural reform cannot substitute for a sense of purpose and clear doctrine. The NATO allies should not delude themselves that they will be able to sustain unity in the field of defense if they continue to drift apart on the key political issues in the name of which any common defense will after all have to be conducted. Shared political purposes will be likelier if European views

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 220  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 221

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
on security and East-West diplomacy (and other matters) emerge from its own analysis, rather than as a response to American decisions and pressures. The result may be a more difficult diplomatic process; it will certainly provide a more solid foundation for security cooperation and policy coordination than exists today.

Specifically:

1. By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for the conventional ground defense. There is no reason why a continent with nearly one and one half times the population and twice the GNP of the Soviet Union should not be able to do so.

2. To reflect the new responsibilities, a distinguished European officer should by then replace the traditional American Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, probably with an American deputy. That would not only reflect the new relationship; it would give a new perspective to Allied strategic planning. In the past, the United States

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 222  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 223


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has generally achieved military success by attrition; we wore down our opponents by the weight of equipment which our superior industrial potential made available. Inevitably this has tempted our military leaders to equate strategy with logistics. European nations have rarely enjoyed such a margin of superiority; their strategy has had to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics. That is precisely the emphasis NATO needs in an age of nuclear parity and renewed emphasis on conventional defense.

3. Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary General--the official responsible for running the political machinery of NATO and its coordination--has been European. In the proposed allocation of responsibilities it would make more sense for the Secretary General to be American--after the term of the new Secretary General, Lord Carrington, expires in 1989. This would reflect the new emphasis on political coordination on both sides of the Atlantic.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 224  
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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 225

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
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4. As the new arrangement goes into effect, Europe should take over the arms control negotiations that directly affect its security. Until now the INF negotiations with the Soviets (dealing with intermediate range missiles) and the MBFR negotiations (dealing with ground forces) have been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a European Chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though predominantly European, delegation.

The structure I propose would create an incentive for Europeans on their own initiative and on their own terms to confront a whole series of issues that have defied resolution for at least two decades: the precise definition of conventional defense; the nature of the nuclear threshold; the relationship between strategy and arms control. Under a European SACEUR the temptation of European leaders to justify sacrifices as a response to American pressure will be reduced. Since

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 226

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 227

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
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nuclear weapons would presumably be used only if conventional defense fails, Europe would bear the responsibility for setting the nuclear threshold by its own choices and its own efforts; it could relieve its nuclear anxieties by the simple expedient of increasing its conventional defenses. And if it did not, increased reliance on American nuclear deployment would clearly be Europe's own choice.

By the same token, European leadership in the MBFR and INF negotiations would place the final responsibility for both conventional force levels and the intermediate range missile deployment with the leaders whose countries will have to bear the brunt--for good or bad--of the outcome of these negotiations. That is particularly true with respect to the stationing of American intermediate range missiles in Europe. That move makes sense only if it is perceived as linking the nuclear defenses of Europe and the United States; if in other words it is believed that they help

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 228

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 229

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
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deter a Soviet conventional attack by raising the prospect of a nuclear blow from Europe on Soviet territory.

If our principal allies do not share this conviction--if they indulge the absurd suspicion that American missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union confine such a war to Europe or if they agree to these missiles only as a price paid for our commitment to European defense, the psychological basis for the current deployment will evaporate sooner or later. European chairmanship of the INF negotiations would oblige European leaders to face the issue head-on: they could abandon the missiles through negotiation; if they did not--as they should not--their opponents would no longer argue that American intransigence is the principal obstacle to arms control. As for the United States it would of course participate in these deliberations--albeit in a less dominant position--through its continued membership in the integrated command, its responsibility for nuclear defense,

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 230

**Image ID:** 15297942



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 231

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and the ground and airforces it will continue to maintain  
in Europe.


#### The Issue of Redeployment

No issue in the Alliance touches raw European nerves more than any hint regarding an alteration in the present American deployment in Europe. Before dealing with it in the context of NATO reform it may be appropriate to state a few undisputed facts:

A. The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces was decided in the 1950's when in fact NATO doctrine was massive retaliation--to respond to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. Since no conventional defense was envisaged, the American force levels in Europe reflected political criteria: they were intended to be large enough to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation and to leave no doubt in the Soviet mind that this would

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 232

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 233

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
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be the consequence of even a conventional war. Paradoxically the deployment was arbitrary from a military point of view and created incentives to keep the overall military establishment on the Continent below the level required for conventional defense. NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by implying that the level of conflict would be limited to the non-nuclear field.

B. This anomalous situation has not fundamentally changed under the existing doctrine of flexible response. Five American divisions remain in Europe--an area which is surely not short of manpower or resources to defend itself against a Soviet Union that must divide its forces on two major fronts. Even though NATO has improved its conventional defenses, it has not really closed the gap in conventional forces; it is still unable to withstand a major Soviet ground attack for more than a few days. European ambivalence continues thirty-five years after NATO's creation. Our allies still

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 234

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 235

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
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want forces strong enough to withstand anything short of a major Soviet attack but not so powerful as to provide an ultimate alternative to the American nuclear deterrent (even while much of their public opinion flees from the concept of nuclear deterrence.)

C. Were we to start all over again we would therefore hardly repeat the decision of the Fifties. With a Europe that has recovered economically and possessing adequate resources of manpower, we would conclude that the sensible division of responsibilities would be for Europe to concentrate on the conventional defense of the Continent. Reflecting our global strategy--in whose success our European allies should also have a stake--we should concentrate on creating and maintaining highly mobile power in the conventional field capable both of backing up Europe and contributing to the defense against aggression, for example, in the Middle East, or Asia or the Western Hemisphere.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 236

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 237

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
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In such a consideration we could justify the present deployment if and only if these precise numbers made the difference between a truly adequate conventional defense against any foreseeable level of Soviet aggression. Of course, there would remain an overwhelming case to maintain some American divisions in Europe both to reassure our allies and to eliminate any Soviet misunderstanding that the defense of Europe no longer reflects a vital American interest. We would also at least maintain and probably strengthen the existing levels of landbased airpower on the Continent. We would continue to make ourselves responsible for both strategic and tactical nuclear defense, assuming that we and the Europeans could agree on a strategy for the latter. American intermediate range missiles would remain in Europe to "couple" the nuclear defenses of both sides of the Atlantic so long as European leaders desire them.

We would be reinforced in our view of the ideal solution

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 238

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 239

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
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by the realization that an American overemphasis on a European ground mission not only is wasteful of limited resources from a global point of view; it also skews the thinking of our military establishment. It causes us to concentrate intellectual energies on an esoteric war of complicated equipment in an area where allies could assume the major responsibility at the expense of building the highly mobile, perhaps simpler forces needed for the defense of regions where conflict is much more probable and other countries are in a much worse position to contribute.

The principal obstacle to what I have described as the "ideal" solution from the point of view of global strategy is psychological. Americans fear that any tinkering with deployment will drive Europe over the precipice into explicit neutralism. Europeans, for all the criticisms of American policy, dread a return to isolationism. But it is also true that pacifism and neutralism are on the

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 240

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**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 241


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march in Europe even under the present set-up. As for the United States, without an agreed NATO strategic doctrine and arms control position, the increasingly frequent controversies over East-West and North-South relations will make it hard to persuade the American public that the existing deployment is justified. Sooner or later the issue will be unavoidable and if the decision is framed in a political context as a single question of whether to continue stationing American troops in Europe and not as a rational element in the over-all design of modernizing the Alliance, adjustments will be arbitrarily imposed by the least effective means--the American budgetary process. Then indeed we might see a psychological wrench away from Europe in America and a panicky resentment in Europe against the United States. Withdrawal without concept, withdrawal for its own sake, might well shock our allies into neutralism; it could mislead our adversary and tempt aggression.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 242  
**Image ID:** 15297954



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 243

**Image ID:** 15297955


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The urgent need is therefore for a high level group to conduct a serious, frank and rapid reexamination of NATO doctrine as an integral part of the comprehensive NATO redesign described earlier. This must avoid the pedantry of previous efforts that drown in unread memoranda and set abstract percentage goals which are either irrelevant or unachievable. A deadline for completion should be set-- certainly no longer than two years. If that study should set clear goals to be reached in yearly increments by which a full conventional defense of Europe can be achieved, only by means of the present American deployment, we would have no reason to tinker with it.

But experience, good sense and the political realities of European domestic priorities, make such a conclusion unlikely. In that case we should begin a gradual withdrawal of up to half of our present ground forces over a period of five years, leaving intact the air and naval forces

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 244

**Image ID:** 15297956



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 245

**Image ID:** 15297957

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
as well as the deployment of intermediate range missiles.

A useful byproduct would be a systematic reevaluation of the existing highly miscellaneous inventory of the very short-range tactical nuclear weapons--a legacy of three decades of ad hoc decisions--which now represent both an increment to deterrence and the greatest danger of unintended nuclear war.

In this scheme withdrawal would not be an end in itself but a means to commit the United States for the indefinite future to a rational, hence sustainable, strategy. To ease the transition we could, if Europe agreed, keep the excess forces in Europe for an interim period in a status analogous to that of the French forces, prepared for use in Europe in support of European defense but also available for use in emergencies outside of Europe. At the same time we would commit ourselves to maintain the remaining forces under the NATO command indefinitely.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 246

**Image ID:** 15297958



Caption: "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 247

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### Political Objectives


Neither organizational nor doctrinal adaptations can cure by themselves the political incoherence looming before NATO. A full treatment of it would go beyond the scope of this article which emphasizes security issues. However, a few general observations are necessary to place the other recommendations into perspective:

A. Those leaders on either side of the Atlantic who value the Alliance with all its failings as the ultimate guardian of Western freedom, must seek to put an end--on an urgent basis--to the political disputes over East-West relations and North-South policy. The tendency to grandstand before domestic audiences, the growing self-righteousness will sooner or later drain even the security element of substance.

B. The United States can not lead the Western alliance or even contribute to its cohesion if we do not restore

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 248

**Image ID:** 15297960



Caption: "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 249

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
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bipartisanship to our foreign policy. Ever since the Vietnam war shattered our unity in foreign policy we have disquieted our friends and confused, where we have not emboldened, our adversaries by periodic reassessments of policy. But the national interest does not change every four or eight years; Great Britain helped maintain the general peace for over a century because other nations could count on the steadiness of its policies through all changes of administration. At some point the national interest must be seen as a constant in the public mind. Or else we shall become an element of instability and irrelevance. A Presidential election year is probably not an ideal year for such an effort. Mr. whoever is the victor in November has no more important and urgent challenge before him than to restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy.

C. In the long run European governments will not be able to avoid meeting head-on the trends towards pacifism and neutralism. It is hopeless to seek to defuse them

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 250

**Image ID:** 15297962



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 251

**Image ID:** 15297963


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by accommodation as too many of them do. This can be done best by putting forward the vision of a new future for the Alliance and not simply the momentum of existing institutions. If European governments feel obliged to defend what are perceived as largely American decisions, they will sooner or later be engulfed by a wave of abdication; they will make concession after concession, progressively becoming hostages of their critics. If they are either unable or unwilling to do so, stumbling along in the status quo will nurture a gradual withering of the Western will.

The proposals outlined here are intended to reinvigorate Western ties. It could promote allied cohesion by relying less on machinery and more on creating incentives to think about common interests and strategic perceptions. It would do this by defining a clear set of responsibilities for each side of the Atlantic. European leaders could defend the usefulness of cooperation with the United States as

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 252  
**Image ID:** 15297964



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 253

**Image ID:** 15297965

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
their own conviction autonomously achieved. American leaders would be able to defend an explicable doctrine and would benefit from dealing with a more equal partner. If the new arrangements are developed gradually and with sensitivity, confidence in them can grow at each step. A new era of allied creativity and American dedication could give inspiration to a new generation that has come to maturity since World War II, lacking a memory of how NATO came to be or what purposes it is designed to serve.

#### Conclusion

I have thought a long time about whether it is appropriate for a former Secretary of State to put forward such drastic proposals. In the end--appalled by the tone and nature of the transatlantic controversy--I came to the view that it would be better if a son of Europe committed to Western unity advanced a new approach rather than have the issue be brought into public debate out of erosion

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 254

**Image ID:** 15297966



**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 255

**Image ID:** 15297967

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and exhaustion under the auspices of neo-isolationists fundamentally opposed to joint efforts. The current condition cries out for a rethinking of the Alliance. Our only choice is whether the inevitable restructuring will come about by acts of creative leadership or whether we are driven to it in response to a series of crises and defeats. It seems to me better to launch a debate which will become inevitable as the decade proceeds and which otherwise will take place under worse circumstances.

The nations bordering the North Atlantic possess the inherent creativity and the resources not only to survive but to prevail. What they need is faith in themselves and the will to resist the siren calls of those who use fear and panic as instruments of policy or of domestic debate. In the end we must fulfill our trust: that the North Atlantic Alliance incarnates the hope of human dignity and decency in our world.

**Caption:** "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time, Mar 5, 1984 [3 of 3], Image 256  
**Image ID:** 15297968

