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**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 1

**Image ID:** 15117244

Wed., February 24, 1988 NY TIMES

[LC]

## Kissinger Balks at Treaty on Strategic Arms

By MICHAEL R. GORDON  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 23 — Henry A. Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, told Congress today that the United States should not conclude a treaty reducing long-range nuclear weapons until progress is made toward a separate agreement on conventional arms in Europe.

"Further steps toward nuclear arms control should be coupled with measures to remove the Soviet conventional superiority overhanging America's allies," Mr. Kissinger told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. Kissinger stopped short of saying that a treaty on long-range nuclear arms should be held in abeyance until the Russians actually cut their conventional arms in Europe.

Rather, he suggested that the United States should first wait to see if the Russians presented a realistic proposal for reducing conventional arms.

### Backs Medium-Range Pact

"At a minimum, the United States should obtain a concrete Soviet scheme" about how to reduce conventional arms. He added that Soviet suggestions to reduce Soviet tanks in return for cuts in American tactical aircraft were unacceptable.

Mr. Kissinger, who appeared before the panel to discuss the recently completed agreement to ban medium- and shorter-range missiles based on land, gave a qualified endorsement of that treaty.

Repeating earlier arguments, Mr. Kissinger severely criticized the agreement for requiring the elimination of American missiles in Europe, which he said were valuable for military reasons and as a symbol of the American commitment to the defense of Europe.

But he then urged that the Senate approve the agreement anyway and said that the Senate should not attach amendments to the agreement that would require reopening the negotia-

## Conventional arms cuts should also be pushed.

tions with the Russians.

He said that failing to ratify the agreement at this point would create a "crisis" within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by undermining the confidence of West European officials in American leadership and encouraging neutralist sentiment there.

### Questions on Consistency

"Were the Senate to reject the treaty, European Governments would undoubtedly be forced by public opinion to insist on the removal of American missiles," he added.

Some Democratic committee members, recalling past statements by Mr. Kissinger and decisions he took while in office, sought to use the hearing to raise questions about some of Mr. Kissinger's recent arguments on arms control.

Senators Alan Cranston, Democrat of California, and John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, raised the question of whether Mr. Kissinger's latest arguments were inconsistent with the arms control arguments he advanced when he was national security adviser to President Nixon.

Pointing to Mr. Kissinger's assertion that issues of long-range nuclear arms and conventional weapons should be linked, the senators noted that Mr. Kissinger did not insist on such linkage when the first strategic arms treaty was completed in 1972.

In reply, Mr. Kissinger asserted that the two situations were not comparable. He noted that a treaty reducing long-range arms would set equal ceilings on American and Soviet weapons. But the 1972 agreement, Mr. Kissinger said, allowed the United States to main-

tain a lead in the number of missile warheads, though this American advantage was only temporary.

### Reagan Remarks

As the Senate committee continued its hearings, President Reagan assured Western allies that the United States would keep its commitment to the defense of Europe.

"After all, our goal is not a nuclear-free, or a tank-free or an army-free Europe, but a war-free Europe," Mr. Reagan said in a speech on the United States Information Agency's Worldnet television network less than a week before his departure for a NATO summit meeting in Brussels. "Our troops will stay in Europe, a guarantee that our destiny is coupled with yours."

"Simply put, an attack on Munich is the same as an attack on Chicago," Mr. Reagan said, stressing the American commitment to Europe's defense. Asked about this remark at the hearing, Mr. Kissinger said: "That's the beginning of wisdom not the end of it. How you implement that statement is the test before us."

Mr. Reagan also reiterated a pledge to seek to reduce conventional forces and to seek a ban on chemical weapons and to negotiate a reduction in long-range arms. But he stressed American opposition to the "de-nuclearization of Europe."

## The U.N. Today

### General Assembly

COMMITTEE ON PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE: SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL SUB-COMMITTEE — 10:30 A.M. and 3 P.M.

COMMITTEE ON ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN — 10 A.M. and 3 P.M.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON U.N. CHARTER — 10:30 A.M. and 3 P.M.


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
**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 2

**Image ID:** 15117245



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 3


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**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 4

**Image ID:** 15117247



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 5

**Image ID:** 15117248

1 that.

2 Senator Helms: So do I.

3 And you said that the fact that the U.S. strategic forces  
4 are far away creates what you called a psychological and  
5 political imbalance which is magnified by the Soviet presence  
6 of superiority in conventional forces.

7 Dr. Kissinger: Correct. If NATO were one nation, then  
8 the location of the strategic forces would be of purely  
9 technical significance. And that is the situation in the  
10 Soviet Union.

11 The place of origin of Soviet nuclear weapons aimed at  
12 Europe is not a major matter. The place of origin of nuclear  
13 weapons in the defense of Europe is a very important matter  
14 because ~~it affects~~, if these weapons are in a different  
15 nation and out of any control of the countries concerned or  
16 out of any situation in which they would become more or less  
17 automatically operationally involved, it creates a  
18 psychological imbalance.


19 Senator Helms: Now, you say that the INF agreement  
20 removes from West Germany only those missiles which can  
21 retaliate against the Soviet Union and leaves only those  
22 short-range missiles which would explode on German territory  
23 and kill the German population, right?

24 Dr. Kissinger: That is creating the problem with respect  
25 to modernization in the Federal Republic, correct.



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 6

**Image ID:** 15117249



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 7

**Image ID:** 15117250

1 Senator Helms: And you said in your statement that this  
2 will have a permanent impact upon West German politics,  
3 creating pressures for the total denuclearization of West  
4 Germany.

5 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

6 Senator Helms: And finally, according to my notes, you  
7 say that this political situation would create a "strain  
8 within the Alliance."

9 Dr. Kissinger: Is a strange kind of strain because  
10 nobody is prepared to make it explicit at this point.

11 Senator Helms: Correct. It certainly would create a  
12 strain within the Alliance.

13 Is not West Germany, to be blunt about it, the key to  
14 NATO's stability?

15 Dr. Kissinger: It has been so conceived in the whole  
16 post-war period.


17 Senator Helms: And would not the denuclearization of  
18 West Germany permanently cripple the effectiveness of NATO?

19 Dr. Kissinger: Well, the denuclearization of the Federal  
20 Republic would almost inevitably lead to a kind of neutralism  
21 which is the modern word for nationalism in Germany because  
22 the denuclearization of Germany makes sense only if it is  
23 coupled with a no-first-use doctrine, which then establishes  
24 the principle that NATO would prefer to be defeated with  
25 conventional weapons rather than use nuclear weapons, which



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 8

**Image ID:** 15117251



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 9

**Image ID:** 15117252

25 [Y]

1 Senator Sarbanes: You earlier said that ratifying the  
2 Treaty could then prove disintegrating of the Atlantic  
3 alliance.

4 Dr. Kissinger: No. If I said that, I misspoke. I said  
5 not ratifying the Treaty would be disintegrative of the  
6 Atlantic alliance.

7 I think negotiating the Treaty has created certain  
8 strains in the alliance that are serious, even though they  
9 are not very explicit. I do not believe they can be cured by  
10 non-ratification.

11 And I think non-ratification would be truly  
12 disintegrative of the Atlantic alliance today, not  
13 ratification. ~~It is not the ratification.~~

14 Senator Sarbanes: Is it likely in your view that failure  
15 to ratify the Treaty would result in a situation in which the  
16 INF weapons of the West would come out in any event and the  
17 Soviets would be able to retain theirs?

18 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.


19 Senator Sarbanes: So that you would end up in a  
20 situation where they had theirs, but we did not have ours;  
21 would that be the case?

22 Dr. Kissinger: One of two things would happen: ~~either~~  
23 ~~that~~ -- it would be entirely up to the Soviets. Either that  
24 would happen or the Soviets would make a big demonstrative  
25 gesture and remove their SS-20's without inspection and get



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
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**Image ID:** 15117253



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 11

**Image ID:** 15117254

26 143  
1 the credit for having made a sacrifice for peace while the  
2 United States has gone the opposite way.

3 So whatever happened, it would not be favorable to us.

4 Senator Sarbanes: Well, either of those developments I  
5 take it you would regard as more negative for western  
6 interests than the problems you see connected with ratifying  
7 the Treaty, is that correct?

8 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

9 Senator Sarbanes: To what extent does your concern about  
10 the Treaty relate to a broader concern about what the west's  
11 overall strategic doctrine is, particularly in the wake of  
12 Reykjavik?

13 Dr. Kissinger: My basic concern is related to the  
14 overall strategic doctrine and to a certain incoherence  
15 between declaratory policy and action policy. And it is  
16 accentuated by the events at and since Reykjavik.

17 Senator Sarbanes: What do you see the essence of that  
18 problem as being?


19 Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think the essence of the NATO  
20 problem has several components. One is that since the early  
21 days of NATO there has been a very heavy reliance on nuclear  
22 weapons.

23 In fact, it started with the doctrine of massive  
24 retaliation, which exclusively relied on nuclear weapons.  
25 Nevertheless, there was a demand for the stationing of



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 12

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**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 13

**Image ID:** 15117256

1 substantial American forces on the continent, even though in  
2 terms of the military doctrine that was being pursued they  
3 were not particularly necessary.

4 The reason they were there was as a kind of tripwire, to  
5 guarantee that the United States would have no choice except  
6 to engage itself, since the European allies had enough

7 experience from their own practice of allies left in the  
8 lurch that they did not want to put us into that position.

9 So therefore there has always been a gap between the  
10 conventional deployment in Europe and the doctrine which was  
11 underlying it.

12 Now, in the fifties, up to the middle sixties, this was  
13 not a huge difficulty because the United States had a vast  
14 nuclear, first an atomic monopoly, then a vast nuclear  
15 superiority.


16 But as the Soviet capacity in nuclear weapons increased,  
17 the credibility of ~~American~~ -- of the United States risking  
18 general nuclear war in the defense of Europe was inevitably  
19 going to decline, not because American leaders are  
20 unreliable, but because nobody should choose suicide as the  
21 only form of military strategy.

22 But NATO has never been prepared to bite that bullet.  
23 And to me, the intermediate range missiles in Europe had the  
24 principal consequence of establishing a link between the  
25 ground defense of Europe and the nuclear defense of Europe.



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 14

**Image ID:** 15117257



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 15

**Image ID:** 15117258

EYD

1 Senator Sarbanes: Well now, you have recommended in the  
2 past that, if the Europeans do not spend more on defense,  
3 that we should take our troops out or take a significant  
4 number of our troops out.

5 Dr. Kissinger: What I recommended was as follows. I  
6 said I would prefer a larger conventional defense of Europe,  
7 but if we are going to be suspended between forces that are  
8 too large for a tripwire and too small for a conventional  
9 defense, then we should do one of two things: We should  
10 either get the approval of the Europeans that part of the  
11 forces in Europe can be used for third area conflicts, in  
12 which we are not then trapped into keeping them in Europe, as  
13 we were forced to in the '73 crisis, where we had to fly all  
14 around Europe to resupply an ally, or else in which two of  
15 the five divisions be returned to America as strategic  
16 reserves.


17 But this was in the absence of the nuclear redeployment.  
18 we are now undertaking under the INF agreement. I think  
19 under present circumstances, if we follow the INF  
20 redeployment with a redeployment of American conventional  
21 forces, the crisis of confidence in Europe would become  
22 unmanageable.

23 Senator Sarbanes: Would not the decoupling effect of  
24 taking that move with respect to troops in fact be greater  
25 than any decoupling effect you are concerned about with



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 16

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**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 17

**Image ID:** 15117260

31

1 the inconsistencies that I have mentioned in reply to Senator  
2 Sarbanes.

3 I believe in retrospect, although I did not, in fairness,  
4 think so inevitably in '79 -- I started thinking so starting  
5 about '81 -- I think the dual track decision was a mistake.  
6 I think the intermediate range missiles should have been put  
7 there on their merits and been coupled with both conventional  
8 and nuclear disarmament or arms control in Europe.

9 But you are quite right, what happened was an inevitable  
10 result of proposals, which in my view were probably made  
11 largely for domestic considerations. It was easier to tell  
12 one's public that one was prepared to withdraw all these  
13 weapons, especially as one never believed the Soviets would  
14 accept such a proposal.

15 Senator Lugar: I think that is an important statement.  
16 I think we have tried to make the point that what is done is  
17 done; we ought to ratify and use this as a basis for other  
18 considerations.


19 But I simply raise the point to gain the answer you have  
20 given: Even if in 1979 the two-track decision was a mistake,  
21 it occurred.

22 Dr. Kissinger: I think we are sliding dangerously into  
23 the following situation. ~~Original~~ when NATO was  
24 ~~originally~~ formed, weapons decisions were made on the basis  
25 of security considerations. Then later on, arms control



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 18

**Image ID:** 15117261



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 19

**Image ID:** 15117262

32

1 negotiations might or might not start, and then existing  
2 weapons deployments were used in the bargaining that  
3 followed, as is the case today with many of the strategic  
4 forces.

5 In the late seventies, it developed that the Soviets  
6 began to assert a right to comment and intervene in  
7 unilateral NATO weapons decisions. And even though the  
8 SS-20's had already been deployed without any *challenge* question by the  
9 West, NATO felt obliged to adopt a double track decision,  
10 which meant that they would first negotiate with the Soviets,  
11 which delayed the deployment by four years to begin with.

12 And it then created the premise that these two weapons  
13 were equivalent, which they are not, and led almost  
14 inevitably logically to the zero option. And we now see it  
15 is happening with respect to short-range weapons which nobody  
16 ever conceived were the subject of prior approval by the  
17 Warsaw Pact, *an* whether we ~~could~~ modernize weapons that were  
18 already in Germany, that had been put into Germany without  
19 the slightest opposition by anybody.


20 And gradually, the Soviets may be getting a veto over our  
21 deployments through these domestic processes in the West, not  
22 just in the United States.

23 Senator Lugar: Well, even if one were to agree that the  
24 1979 decision was a mistake, is it not also true that it  
25 would have been difficult to gain that degree of accord in



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 20

**Image ID:** 15117263



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 21

**Image ID:** 15117264

34 [Y]  
1 to fulfillment.

2 I mention this because it seems to me that it is so  
3 important to grasp the significance of your conclusion as to  
4 what now as we review the difficulties.

5 Dr. Kissinger: I am very uneasy with what I see  
6 happening. First of all, I think three years ago Chancellor  
7 Kohl would have agreed to modernization of the Lances. It  
8 would not have been any domestic issue at all. It would have  
9 happened.

10 In fact, they agreed to it and many people were not even  
11 aware that that decision had been taken. Now, I noticed in  
12 some testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,  
13 one of the German witnesses who is <sup>for</sup> ~~pro~~ the modernization  
14 nevertheless felt that it had to be tied into an arms control  
15 package that was geared to the removal of some of the nuclear  
16 weapons, plus some other considerations.

17 And before we know it, we are going to have slid down the  
18 road again where the principle of zero in the short range  
19 field is accepted for some undefined quid pro quo, and then  
20 we are well <sup>on the</sup> ~~under~~ way to the denuclearization of Germany,  
21 which I think is a disaster for the West.

22 I would urge the greatest care at this time in going down  
23 that road.


24 Senator Lugar: I would agree.

25 Let me just ask this question. with regard to our



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 22

**Image ID:** 15117265



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 23

**Image ID:** 15117266

1 European allies, we have made speculative judgments about  
2 their politics, how they will react to this. What is your  
3 own judgment about the willingness of Europeans to defend  
4 themselves at this point?

5 Dr. Kissinger: I think one of the ~~good results of~~  
6 potentially good results of Reykjavik and the INF agreement,  
7 ~~neither of which I would have recommended if somebody would~~  
8 ~~have asked me ahead of time, one of the good results is that~~  
9 the defense-oriented Europeans are now more willing ~~to think~~  
10 to consider a common European defense effort, and to push  
11 European unity into the field of defense.

12 I think the challenge to the United States is to be  
13 receptive to this effort. The United States has so far  
14 favored <sup>European</sup> ~~the~~ economic unity, but has been less willing to  
15 support defense unity, out of fear that this might be  
16 disruptive of the Atlantic alliance.


17 In my view, European economic unity is likely to be  
18 inherently competitive with the United States. In defense, I  
19 cannot conceive of an eastern threat to Europe in which  
20 Europe would not be better off with American support than  
21 without American support. So it is likely to bring us  
22 together.

23 And I hope, ~~and I have no reason to doubt that this is~~  
24 ~~the view, I hope~~ that the United States supports efforts to  
25 strengthen the U.S.-European union and efforts by France and



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 24

**Image ID:** 15117267



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 25

**Image ID:** 15117268

1 Dr. Kissinger: In the early seventies we were not  
2 actually negotiating any significant reductions. We were  
3 negotiating ceilings on forces. SALT I established the  
4 ceiling approximately where it was in the unilateral programs  
5 of the two sides, and there were no significant reductions  
6 envisaged at the time.

7 Moreover, in the early 1970s we had multiple warheads and  
8 they did not yet.


9 In the current situation, I believe we face the problem  
10 that it is becoming harder and harder to visualize what a  
11 security advisor or Secretary of Defense or Secretary of  
12 State or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would tell a  
13 President the objective of a strategic nuclear war initiated  
14 from the United States would be in response to a conventional  
15 attack, and therefore, I believe that we are heading into a  
16 situation in which the overhang of the Soviet conventional  
17 forces on the territories adjoining them is becoming a more  
18 serious problem than it was in the early seventies.

19 In 1973, at the time of the Middle East war, there was an  
20 increase in the readiness of our nuclear forces. At that  
21 time we had, I forget, we still had a very vast superiority  
22 in warheads over the Soviet Union. In the early nineties  
23 this would not necessarily not only not be the case, but our  
24 land-based forces would probably be vulnerable to a Soviet  
25 nuclear attack and without a reciprocal ability to hold



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
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**Image ID:** 15117269



Caption: Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 27

Image ID: 15117270

1 Dr. Kissinger: I would have to know what it is that is  
2 supposed to be restrained before I could make a judgment on  
3 it.

4 Senator Cranston: Yes, of course you would.

5 One question, if we did seek to link conventional  
6 progress to fulfillment of a START treaty, that could cause a  
7 long delay in getting to it with START. Gorbachev, as you  
8 know, has made some interesting statements about a desire to  
9 redress the imbalance and to make asymmetrical adjustments in  
10 Europe in conventional forces.

11 Do you have any suggestions as to how, with some  
12 reasonable dispatch and swiftness, we can come to grips with  
13 that and explore and find out how serious those statements  
14 really are?


15 Dr. Kissinger: Well, of course, ~~I have been working~~, I  
16 was working when I was an academician on arms control since  
17 its beginning. But I think ~~you will agree~~, both students of  
18 arms control will agree that studies that have been made have  
19 concerned almost exclusively nuclear matters, and that the  
20 conventional issue has not been addressed with equal  
21 seriousness.

22 ~~I have only, speaking for myself~~ I have only myself  
23 started thinking about it recently, and I received some  
24 briefings, for which I hold no brief, but which I found  
25 rather impressive, which suggested that the imbalance in



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 28

**Image ID:** 15117271



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 29

**Image ID:** 15117272

1 Europe is such that reductions of less than five to one in  
2 our favor in the conventional forces would actually make the  
3 situation worse. I have not made these studies myself, but  
4 they were done by serious people.

5 Now, even if one negotiated specific reductions, one  
6 would have a massive problem of verification, and one would  
7 have to determine what is one talking about? Do these forces  
8 have to be disbanded, do they have to be moved to another  
9 part of Soviet and Western territory? Any force that is  
10 demobilized, that is, reduced in Germany or in <sup>Western</sup> Europe would  
11 probably have to be ~~demobilized~~ <sup>demobilized</sup> away with. I mean, there is no  
12 place you can put them in Germany or the low countries that  
13 would provide an adequate buffer.

14 So these are very serious questions, and this is why in  
15 my statement I said that if we could agree as to a concept  
16 without yet having negotiated it that gives us an idea of  
17 what such a balance would look like, one could proceed with  
18 START, which is different from what I wrote in my article.


19 Senator Cranston: You are talking of concept and not a  
20 concrete negotiated agreement.

21 Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I would like ~~but what can one~~  
22 ~~do? I would ask~~ the Soviets to table a proposal of what they  
23 mean by conventional arms control. Where are their units  
24 going to be, who does away with what? And if we hear that we  
25 have to take all our strike aircraft out of Europe in return



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 30

**Image ID:** 15117273



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 31

**Image ID:** 15117274

1 Dr. Kissinger: No.

2 [Laughter.]

3 Dr. Kissinger: The problem seems to me to be this.

4 Historically we face in the Soviet Union a country that has,  
5 both under tsars and commissars, has constantly expanded. It  
6 is impossible to find a 50 year period of history in which it  
7 has not expanded in some direction. And if you get a  
8 historical atlas and compare the Soviet empire or Russian  
9 empire at the end of <sup>any century</sup> starting with 1603 when the Romanovs  
10 came in, you can find this expansion.

11 So how to establish an equilibrium between a country that  
12 is eleven times our size and its neighbors is an inherently  
13 difficult problem and is at the heart of security issues.


14 Now, I am not insisting that one begins with its  
15 neighbors, and I know that many people say, and correctly,  
16 that Russia and the Soviet Union have often been invaded; and  
17 therefore they have a peculiar sensitivity on the issue of  
18 security. But Angola and Nicaragua are about as far away  
19 from the Soviet Union as you can get in this world, and it is  
20 my understanding, I am told by governmental people whom you  
21 have a better opportunity to question than I, that a billion  
22 dollars worth of arms was sent to Angola last year, <sup>plus</sup> ~~less~~  
23 Russian military personnel, and \$600 million of arms were  
24 sent to Nicaragua.

25 I hold no brief for these figures, but they have been



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 32

**Image ID:** 15117275



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 33

**Image ID:** 15117276

47

1 come up with it. But it cannot go on that everything on our  
2 side of the line is subject to undermining and everything on  
3 their side of the line is sacrosanct without sooner or later  
4 leading to a confrontation which is in nobody's interest.

5 That is my concern.

6 Senator Evans: Would you, in terms of timing, in terms  
7 of timing and type, would you have this done now or in  
8 conjunction with the INF treaty ratification or subsequent to  
9 that, and in terms of type, would these negotiations be  
10 better carried on, or the debate that you suggest be better  
11 carried on in public, in private negotiations with the  
12 Soviets, or part of each?


13 Dr. Kissinger: Well, I do not think it can be, it cannot  
14 be linked to the INF agreement because of the reasons that I  
15 have already given, although I would certainly personally  
16 welcome a Senate, if the Senate saw fit to express its view  
17 that the political issues need to be dealt with side by side  
18 with the weapons issues, I believe that might be helpful as a  
19 nonbinding expression of a Senate consensus, ~~or as a binding~~  
20 ~~of Senate consensus.~~

21 Now, should it be done privately or should it be done  
22 publicly? I think ~~it depends on~~ both. Now, there is a  
23 ritual in which so-called third area conflicts are on every  
24 agenda of every Secretary of State and of every summit  
25 meeting, but my impression is that they are almost never



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 34

**Image ID:** 15117277



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 35

**Image ID:** 15117278

50 [Y]  
1 decoupling now if it was an either/or situation then?

2 Dr. Kissinger: Well, this was not an article, this was a  
3 transcript of an extemporaneous speech I gave to a conference  
4 in Brussels, and I think you will agree that when you read  
5 that speech, that 99 percent of it deals with the declining  
6 credibility of strategic nuclear forces, and an appeal to  
7 Europeans to face the facts of the eighties and nineties.

8 The 30 years was given by the editor of that Journal. I made  
9 no such claim, I hope not, anyway, in the speech.

10 I have been asked that question before, so I have had a  
11 chance to look at my speech. I think the reference to the  
12 SS-20s and to what is now called INF was a parenthetical  
13 comment and was not even remotely central to my argument,  
14 which indicated that I had not thought through the problem.


15 I would say that starting in 1981, when I had thought  
16 more about the problem, I took the consistent position ~~that~~  
17 the decoupling, that in the sixties and seventies we still  
18 had a considerable strategic superiority, at least until the  
19 middle seventies, and then we had a period of grace because  
20 thinking does not adjust to strategic and technological  
21 realities as rapidly as it should. So we still got credit  
22 for having a strategic superiority.

23 But starting in the eighties, it was obvious, at least to  
24 me, that the strategic nuclear threat based on weapons that  
25 were based in the United States or at sea would no longer be



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 36

**Image ID:** 15117279



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 37

**Image ID:** 15117280

CYJ  
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1 Dr. Kissinger: Well, Walter Slocombe is a man of  
2 extraordinary intelligence whom I have known since he was a  
3 student at Harvard and I was a young professor there, and for  
4 a brief period he either worked on my staff or as a  
5 consultant to my staff.

6 I think the difference here is between whether you look  
7 at this problem from the point of view of systems analysis or  
8 from the point of view of political decisionmaking. If you  
9 look at it from the point of view of systems analysis, you  
10 look at NATO as one strategic area, and within that context,  
11 it does not make any difference where the weapons are  
12 located, assuming that there is a uniform readiness to use  
13 them. If you look at it from the point of view of political  
14 decisionmaking, however, then you do not look at NATO as a  
15 single area, and you know that there is not a uniform  
16 readiness to use them.


17 The utility of the INF weapons stationed in Europe was as  
18 follows. Certainly one should not put the issue in terms of  
19 total credibility and total incredibility. It will move  
20 through ~~shades~~ many shades of grey before one gets into a  
21 black and white situation. One therefore talks about  
22 relative weights.

23 I think a situation will arise or has arisen or is about  
24 to arise -- this is again one of those grey areas -- in which  
25 honesty requires one to say that the decision, if anything,



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 38

**Image ID:** 15117281



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 39

**Image ID:** 15117282

54

1 It is left to a formal political decision with a lot of time,  
2 it will not be easy to make an argument for the use of  
3 strategic nuclear weapons, especially when they have been  
4 designed, partly, frankly, under congressional pressures, in  
5 such a way that they are not useful for military targeting  
6 but largely for bringing about cataclysmic outcomes.


7 ~~So that even the overrunning, certainly the overrunning~~  
8 of American forces would create a presumption that we will do  
9 something, but Secretary McNamara has said that he had made a  
10 private decision -- he said so publicly -- never to recommend  
11 to the President the use of strategic nuclear weapons, or for  
12 all I know, of any nuclear weapons. There have been many  
13 flat statements to that effect. Chancellor Schmidt has said  
14 publicly that he had made the private decision to surrender  
15 before anything like this happened.

16 Now, these are facts that one has to keep in mind. The  
17 presence of the intermediate-range weapons in Europe was a  
18 crude way by which a Soviet leader, looking at them, had to  
19 calculate that whatever foolishness the Americans might  
20 commit, they would not permit those weapons to be overrun  
21 without having authorized somebody to fire them. If they  
22 were fired, even if they attacked these weapons, then, and  
23 even if they got 95 percent of them, the remaining 5 percent  
24 would do huge damage in the Soviet Union, that they could not  
25 accept while leaving the United States undisturbed, and



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 40

**Image ID:** 15117283



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 41

**Image ID:** 15117284

56

1 The Chairman: The Committee will come to order. The  
2 Chair recognizes the Senator from Kansas, Mrs. Kassebaum.

3 Senator Kassebaum: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr.  
4 Kissinger, I would like to ask a couple of questions on  
5 verification and compliance.

6 You were instrumental in negotiating SALT I and really  
7 ever since then we have been concerned about verification.  
8 We have argued the merits or demerits of the Standing  
9 Consultative Commission. Under the INF Treaty there is a  
10 call for the Special Verification Commission.

11 I found quite interesting what you said in your statement  
12 regarding new verification procedures must deal with three  
13 issues, and then you lay them out. I was wondering what, in  
14 your view, you would recommend in handling the compliance  
15 issues in the future.


16 Do you think that the verification, the new Verification  
17 Commission, as it is structured, has some merit? Or do you  
18 feel that basically we are going to have to have the ability  
19 to know what we want to do with it once we feel there is  
20 non-compliance?

21 Dr. Kissinger: Let me make a general a observation. As  
22 I have viewed these arms control negotiations, every  
23 agreement is sold to the Senate and to the public with the  
24 proposition that there will be very fierce *insistence on* compliance and  
25 that the Administration will be extremely vigilant. And this



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 42

**Image ID:** 15117285



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 43

**Image ID:** 15117286

1 is very sincere.

2 Then opponents of the agreement often use verification as  
3 an issue, first to question it, when it is up for  
4 ratification, and afterwards to try to find violations. Now,  
5 some of these violations are genuine violations and some of  
6 them are technical violations.

7 And so very soon a defensive cast of mind develops in the  
8 Administration in office when it is ~~confronted~~ <sup>unfettered</sup> with technical  
9 violations <sup>to the effect</sup> that it is being harassed. Then the whole debate  
10 goes off the deep end. Because there are some violations  
11 that are not threatening to the agreement, and not intended  
12 to be.

13 I remember one apparent violation that occurred when I  
14 was in government where the Soviets were building in every  
15 missile field one additional silo. And that amounted to  
16 about 60 silos.


17 Now, that looked like a violation. On the other hand,  
18 they were saying this was a command and control silo. And I  
19 would have to go on television and <sup>express my doubts</sup> ~~say it is a command and~~  
20 ~~control silo~~.

21 Then somebody would say, would it not be nice to have a  
22 Secretary of State who does not defend the Soviets? My view  
23 was that if the Soviets wanted to violate the agreement, they  
24 would not build one silo in each field. And what would they  
25 do with 60 additional silos?



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 44

**Image ID:** 15117287



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 45

**Image ID:** 15117288

CYD  
59

1 permit us to put Pershings and GLCMs back into Europe. So  
2 that we have practically no equivalent countermeasures left.  
3 These are things to analyze.

4 Now, with respect to this new procedure, we have to take  
5 care that particular slogans do not become a substitute for  
6 concrete action. We have talked ourselves into the  
7 importance of on-site inspection. And we think this is a  
8 great success that we have achieved, some on-site  
9 inspection.

10 I must tell you, I am not so sure this is necessarily the  
11 case. On-site inspection should be judged like any other  
12 method, on what it actually adds to our national means. Now,  
13 you take the INF inspection. As I understand it, we can only  
14 look at those areas they have designated as base areas. We  
15 cannot look at the others.


16 Now, if you have a very large house and it is suspected  
17 of being a weapons depo, and somebody says you can look at  
18 those three rooms but you cannot look at the other 25 rooms,  
19 have you made progress towards on-site inspection *especially* if you  
20 cannot even challenge the original data they give you and go  
21 into areas which they have not designated as base areas?

22 Secondly, is the question of bureaucratic management. It  
23 is my understanding that we need about 600 to 700 people to  
24 operate this system. ~~Now~~ they have to report to somebody.  
25 And this somebody has to report to somebody.



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 46

**Image ID:** 15117289



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 47

**Image ID:** 15117290

60  
CYD

1 And how are you going to get it to the attention of the  
2 top people who have to make the assessment? And how can you  
3 keep it from the endless controversies that arise between  
4 those who want to maintain the agreement and therefore lean  
5 over backward in one direction, and those who want to scrap  
6 the agreement and may lean over too far in the other  
7 direction?

8 I do not want to be misunderstood. I am not against  
9 on-site inspection. But we ought to analyze on-site  
10 inspection the same way, there is nothing sacrosanct about  
11 it.

12 I would analyze it in the same way I analyze national  
13 inspection. Does it meet the three criteria ~~that have been~~  
14 that are put forward here? Or any other criteria that we  
15 might set up?


16 And are we running the risk now that we may get 50  
17 percent START agreement? Now, with INF, all we need to do is  
18 to find out that there is no weapon, but how do you count 50  
19 percent? It is a much more stringent system.

20 Now, do we need 5,000? And how do we build them into our  
21 decision-making system? I think this requires some careful  
22 thought, and I would be interested to get an intelligence  
23 analysis of the degree to which they think, by what  
24 percentage do they think the <sup>on-site</sup> system of INF adds to our  
25 national capacities.



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 48

**Image ID:** 15117291



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 49

**Image ID:** 15117292

1 certainly understand the degree to which they have  
2 modernized.

3 But likewise, we have had the introduction of the F-16,  
4 the introduction of the F-15, we have had the introduction of  
5 the multiple-launch rocket systems, we have had the best  
6 sensor system in the world with the AWACs, plus in 1973, as I  
7 know you recall, we had significant troop problems by virtue  
8 of the concentration on Vietnam. There were drug problems,  
9 race relation problems, equipment shortages, and so forth.

10 Those, all of those issues having changed and our own  
11 generals, admirals, et cetera, arguing that there is now a  
12 neutrality, I wonder where you feel that there is not that  
13 neutrality? Where specifically is this imbalance?

14 Dr. Kissinger: Well, I believe there are a number of  
15 factors to be considered.


16 One, the Soviet Union has a geographic advantage, which  
17 ~~is not due to anybody's fault. It is inherent in geography.~~  
18 They have the interior lines of communication, and therefore  
19 they can shift their forces between their various fronts much  
20 more easily than we can.

21 Secondly, it is, at least every military person that I  
22 have talked to, plus the studies that I have seen, for  
23 example, at the Rand Corporation, in which the war games,  
24 various outcomes indicate that on any hypothesis the Soviets  
25 would make very significant territorial gains, even in a



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 50

**Image ID:** 15117293



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 51

**Image ID:** 15117294

1 It has developed a sort of mechanical quality where all  
2 reductions are considered of equal quality. I have  
3 attempted, for example, to put the numbers of the 50 percent  
4 reduction into outcomes. I mean, what forces would then  
5 exist?

6 I think all of you who have done it or who can get it  
7 done will find that the <sup>ratio</sup> ~~number~~ of warheads aimed at our  
8 missiles will increase rather than decrease, and therefore I  
9 ask myself, what are we trying to accomplish?

10 Is this simply a theological exercise in which we prove  
11 to ourselves that we can do it? Our aircraft are reduced,  
12 our submarines are reduced, but the anti-aircraft defenses  
13 and the anti-submarine defenses are not reduced. But the  
14 anti-missile defenses, we are told, have to be reduced.

15 Now, can somebody take a step back and analyze where we  
16 are trying to go and what we are trying to achieve before we  
17 start rushing into numbers exercises?


18 Senator Kerry: Specifically, with respect to that, and  
19 incidentally I agree with you completely about the current  
20 START instructions, which will result in almost a 10 to one  
21 ratio of their missiles against our land-based missiles,  
22 which I think takes us back in time. I am not sure if you  
23 agree with that.

24 Dr. Kissinger: My calculations show about five to one.  
25 But it does not make any difference. It makes it worse. It



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 52

**Image ID:** 15117295



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 53

**Image ID:** 15117296

1 and that was an unfriendly act. You also said that it served  
2 no national defense purpose and so forth.

3 And you also spoke about Angola and the \$1 billion that  
4 went down that way. I wonder if you would assess for me how  
5 serious and how realistic you feel Mr. Gorbachev has been  
6 about withdrawing from Afghanistan? Certainly the  
7 considerations are much different there.

8 Dr. Kissinger: It is a good question. I find it hard to  
9 answer because my instinct would be that it would be totally  
10 unprecedented for them to withdraw from a country.

11 And therefore, while I have serious doubts about the  
12 agreement we are discussing here, I would consider a Soviet  
13 withdrawal from Afghanistan, under conditions that do not  
14 ~~create another prelude to~~ *understandably as a prelude* their ultimate domination, I would  
15 consider it a significant event.

16 They certainly talk as if they are going to withdraw.  
17 Which also is a tribute to our determination in supplying the  
18 freedom fighters there. We will know in a few weeks how  
19 serious he is. It has gone further than I thought it would.


20 Senator Boschwitz: I agree. You know, it seems strange  
21 that a country that would expend those kind of funds so far  
22 away from home would suddenly be really serious about  
23 withdrawing from a country --

24 Dr. Kissinger: Well, it could be that the adjoining  
25 Moslem areas of the Soviet Union become too restive under the



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 54

**Image ID:** 15117297



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 55

**Image ID:** 15117298

1 impact of it.

2 It could be that the casualties are too heavy. It could  
3 be a regrouping. It could be that they may even believe that  
4 they could hold on to a dominant position there. But it is  
5 an unusual step.

6 Senator Boschwitz: In talking about the Pershings and  
7 GLCMs and the fact that the Russians would have to calculate  
8 that the Americans would do something rather than allowing  
9 those weapons to be overrun, that that was a serious  
10 deterrent that you could not equivalently get from something  
11 that is based in North Dakota or Montana.

12 I wonder how you would characterize the other weapons  
13 that we have? Submarine weapons, what would their  
14 calculations have to be? Or the F-111s in Great Britain.  
15 Would the same type, they are not the cataclysmic type of  
16 weapons.


17 Dr. Kissinger: Well, first of all, the submarines cannot  
18 be seen. I think they would calculate that the likelihood of  
19 using submarines is the same as the likelihood of using  
20 Minuteman or MXs, that it would require a Presidential  
21 decision *will require* ~~in which he would take a reasonable amount~~ any  
22 prudent President would take a reasonable amount of time.

23 The "advantages," in quotation marks, of the land-based  
24 missiles in Europe was that the rate at which they would have  
25 to be fired was dependent on the speed of their own



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 56

**Image ID:** 15117299



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 57

**Image ID:** 15117300

71 [YJ]

1 operations. So that the danger of their being overrun would  
2 determine the probability of their being fired.

3 This is not true of submarines. It is also not really  
4 true of the F-111s in Britain, which for these purposes are  
5 also outside the combat theater. Moreover, these F-111s in  
6 Britain are <sup>all</sup> based on one base. And it is easier to get rid  
7 of one base than of dispersed mobile missiles.

8 But certainly I do not say they are of no deterrent  
9 value.

10 Senator Boschwitz: But the fact that they are easier to  
11 get rid of because they are on one base must also serve as a  
12 deterrent?

13 Dr. Kissinger: That is true. I think the F-111s  
14 constitute some deterrent advantage. But they were always  
15 there.

16 I mean, we cannot have it both ways. We cannot say those  
17 weapons were of no significance, and secondly ~~they are a~~  
18 ~~major contribution to arms control~~, that their removal is a  
19 major contribution to arms control.

20 Senator Boschwitz: But the fact that a different type of  
21 decision-making process is necessary to use them makes a  
22 different type of deterrence, I think would be your  
23 argument.


24 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

25 Senator Boschwitz: Dr. Edward Teller was here yesterday,



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 58

**Image ID:** 15117301



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 59

**Image ID:** 15117302

72 [Y]  
1 and unfortunately not all of my colleagues were here to hear  
2 him.

3 But he, in a way, conditioned his advice to us, in voting  
4 yes on the Treaty, he kind of conditioned that on the further  
5 development of SDI and also added that fewer weapons made the  
6 SDI in effect more effective, more valuable, and that he  
7 therefore spurred us on with respect to combining the  
8 research and development necessary for the SDI.

9 I wonder if you would comment? You commented to some  
10 degree.

11 Dr. Kissinger: well, I would not make the SDI  
12 conditional on this agreement. On the other hand, I would  
13 not abandon SDI as part of the START agreement. Nor would I  
14 de facto abandon SDI.

15 I think a combination of deployment restrictions and  
16 testing restrictions will, in fact, ~~not restrictions but~~  
17 ~~prohibitions~~ will in fact lead to a de facto abandonment of  
18 SDI.


19 ~~Now, I think~~ we need a definition of what it is we want  
20 to accomplish with SDI. I think the concept that we can get  
21 a perfect population defense against an all-out Soviet attack  
22 is so far in the future, if it is attainable at all, that it  
23 leads to a needless debate as to feasibility.

24 Senator Boschwitz: Dr. Teller, I might say, agreed with  
25 that. He said that there is no perfect offense or perfect



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 60

**Image ID:** 15117303



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 61

**Image ID:** 15117304

1 defense.

2 Dr. Kissinger: But there are many intermediate  
3 objectives.

4 For example, I was briefed by one group that was opposed  
5 to SDI that was trying to tell me, and again I hold no brief  
6 for their numbers, I am giving you what I was briefed. They  
7 were trying to tell me that if the existing Soviet arsenal  
8 were aimed ~~even~~ at the now foreseeable SDI, the SDI would be  
9 overwhelmed.

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
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**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 62

**Image ID:** 15117305



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 63

**Image ID:** 15117306

1 I then said, let me understand what you mean by  
2 overwhelmed. I said, what happens if they launch 1,000  
3 warheads? Oh, we would get 99.9 percent or maybe all of  
4 them.

5 This went on until we got to about 4,000 warheads. The  
6 defense was degraded in that analysis only from about 6,000  
7 warheads on. Now, if one could get the Soviets into a  
8 position where the only nuclear war they can fight is one in  
9 which they have to launch 5,000 to 6,000 warheads, that is a  
10 different decision from one in which they can blackmail us  
11 with one or two or five. This is what we need to analyze.

12 Incidentally, the Soviet Chief of Staff said that at the  
13 level of 6,000 warheads, an SDI defense could be quite  
14 effective, which tends to support that. ~~And that is why he~~  
15 ~~does not want to go down to 6,000 with SDI.~~

16 Now, it seems to me that we can probably all agree that  
17 if we could achieve a defense for our strategic forces this  
18 would add to stability. ~~Now,~~ the question is, what degree of  
19 defense should one get for the civilian population?


20 I find it very difficult to imagine ~~that a democracy,~~  
21 that a democratic leader can tell his public that their total  
22 vulnerability and the capacity of an adversary to exterminate  
23 them is the permanent assurance of their security without  
24 demoralizing them.

25 Now, against what level of attack? I would think at



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 64

**Image ID:** 15117307



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 65

**Image ID:** 15117308

1 Do they see this as a sign of America's strength or  
2 weakness? Is it more a complexion of perhaps the new General  
3 Secretary's efforts to portray himself as a leader of the  
4 world who objective it is to ease tensions?

5 I wonder if you could share from your experience what you  
6 assume they, the Soviets, feel about our position and the  
7 likelihood of where the United States will be in relation to  
8 the Soviet Union, recognizing we all like to have a superior  
9 position in nuclear or non-nuclear capability for our  
10 national security interests. Could you just generally --

11 Dr. Kissinger: Well, as I have said perhaps too often, I  
12 wish this particular Treaty had never been made. And I do  
13 this because I think it gives more benefits to the Soviets in  
14 the long term than to us. So obviously they want it  
15 ratified.


16 But to deal with the immediate question, I would suppose  
17 that if this Treaty now failed of ratification, it would be a  
18 setback to Gorbachev. And one would then have to calculate  
19 how they assess this, because they might think we will be  
20 forced to withdraw our weapons anyway. And they can then  
21 play the game of either keeping theirs there or pulling

22 theirs out as a unilateral act *which gives them greater*  
*propaganda advantages*  
23 The more fundamental question or issue that is raised by  
24 your question is, what do we have to do, I mean is Gorbachev  
25 really interested in an improvement in relations? And what



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 66

**Image ID:** 15117309



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 67

**Image ID:** 15117310

CYD  
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1 does he understand by improvement of relations?

2 Now, I think certainly the Soviet Union needs a respite.  
3 And it is surely in their interest to have a period in which  
4 they can reduce some military expenditures. But it is also  
5 the case that it seems to me very dangerous to gear American  
6 foreign policy to the personality of a single Soviet leader.

7 ~~Every~~ ~~No~~ Soviet leader has ever done anything other than  
8 renounce the policies of his predecessor. So, even if you  
9 assume the best intentions in Gorbachev, which I do not, but  
10 even if you did, you would still have to ask yourself what  
11 are his successors going to do and what is the objective  
12 situation that they and the successors to our President will  
13 inherit?


14 Secondly, there is no doubt that Gorbachev is undertaking  
15 a huge program of economic and some limited political  
16 reform. He does that because he recognizes that if the  
17 present trends continue the Soviet Union will be the most  
18 developed of the underdeveloped countries, and will have the  
19 greatest difficulty of maintaining its position as a  
20 superpower. He is not doing it in order to get along better  
21 with us.

22 ~~Then~~ For that reason, he wants a respite. Now,  
23 Americans, because we have never been exposed to  
24 irreconcilable hostility, because we have never known  
25 irrevocable disaster, have a tendency to believe that peace



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 68

**Image ID:** 15117311



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 69

**Image ID:** 15117312

1 this Treaty is not ratified. Or if it is not amended or  
2 modified to make sense, because it is now full of holes as a  
3 piece of swiss cheese.

4 Dr. Klssinger: I think there is a difference between  
5 SALT II and the INF Treaty. I was much less strong, in fact  
6 I did not use, you quoted me correctly. I stated both sides  
7 of the Issue then.

8 Senator Helms: Yes, you did. And I commend you for it.

9 Dr. Klssinger: Now, there is this difference. SALT II  
10 concerned only weapons that were under United States' control  
11 and stationed either in the United States or at sea.  
12 Therefore, the deployment of these weapons had not carried  
13 any political cost or risk for these European leaders.

14 So whether we reduced them or not might have had a  
15 symbolic significance, and their interest in it was because  
16 of the idea that had developed that this was needed to ease  
17 tensions. But otherwise, it did not have the same  
18 implications.


19 The INF agreement, on the other hand, involved  
20 significant decisions that were taken in the face of massive  
21 domestic opposition. That domestic opposition had been  
22 overcome.

23 And then in a period in which there was no particular  
24 pressure for the removal of those weapons within these *European*  
25 countries, the United States developed a theory where they



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 70

**Image ID:** 15117313



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 71

**Image ID:** 15117314

1 became dispensable. First at Reykjavik and later in the  
2 implementing negotiations.

3 Now, we have the situation where people like Kohl and  
4 Woerner, to take the Federal Republic, who paid a heavy  
5 price, not only had to give up those weapons but also  
6 weapons, namely the Pershing Is that had always been ~~in the~~  
7 ~~Federal Republic~~ <sup>stationed</sup> in the Federal Republic. Until recently  
8 they had been there uncontested for 15 years. And they had  
9 agreed to both of these decisions.

10 Now, if we suddenly reverse ourselves once again and say  
11 the first position was the right one, I think we are putting  
12 them into a nearly impossible situation.

13 Senator Helms: well, forgive me, though. There is one  
14 element in the equation that you have not referred to, and  
15 that is the people of Germany and the people of France.

16 They would have to know that they would have to do  
17 without the support of the United States.


18 Dr. Kissinger: I would say this, Senator Helms. If the  
19 German government had asked us to remove these weapons  
20 without provocation, then your response would be absolutely  
21 the one we should take.

22 When, however, they first put these weapons in, then  
23 reluctantly with great American persuasion, let us take them  
24 out and added their own weapons to it. And then less than  
25 half of the Senate but more than a third votes against



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 72

**Image ID:** 15117315



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 73

**Image ID:** 15117316

1 ratification, they are left in a very difficult position.

2 I do not think we would be morally justified to say, now,  
3 if you do not accept the latest version of American  
4 ~~Constitutional procedure~~ *strategic thought*, we are going to take our ground  
5 forces out too.

6 I think this would create an impossible situation. If,  
7 unprovoked, they were to ask us this, then I think your  
8 response would be absolutely correct.

9 Senator Helms: well, I think the mothers and fathers of  
10 this country would welcome an indication from all of us that  
11 we are not going to leave our troops over there in an  
12 untenable position where they can get shot and killed. That  
13 is the point I am making.

14 Dr. Kissinger: I would welcome an expression of the  
15 Senate that the denuclearization of the Federal Republic  
16 would carry those consequences. The third zero option, I  
17 think that would be a very appropriate thing to do.

18 Senator Helms: I would just say in conclusion that I am  
19 struck by the identical nature of the exhortations that we  
20 have got to ratify this Treaty when we heard the same thing  
21 in 1979 and NATO did not collapse.


22 Now, here we are hearing the same thing in 1988. Thank  
23 you, Mr. Chairman.

24 The Chairman: I will waive my time, and we will go to  
25 Senator Sarbanes.



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 74

**Image ID:** 15117317



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 75

**Image ID:** 15117318

92  
[Y]

1 Dr. Kissinger: I believe, and here we are in the area of  
2 pure conjecture, that this agreement and this sequence of  
3 events that has led to it, has brought about a sea change in  
4 the German domestic political situation, and that therefore  
5 we will see over a period of five years some very significant  
6 evolutions in German domestic politics, ~~and it is in terms of~~  
7 ~~that~~ I think there will be a greater emphasis on national  
8 concerns, greater emphasis on dealing with the East on a  
9 national basis, and in the context of this, I think it will  
10 be very difficult to reintroduce <sup>nuclear missiles</sup> them in the Federal  
11 Republic. And absent that, it will be very difficult to  
12 reintroduce them anywhere else except perhaps Great Britain.

13 But I could be wrong. We are in the area of total  
14 conjecture and analysis of political trends.

15 Senator Sarbanes: Let me ask you this question.

16 Do you worry that agreements, arms agreements in  
17 particular, with the Soviets contribute to some illusory  
18 notion of detente which impedes the West from taking  
19 realistic policies in other areas of the relationship?


20 Dr. Kissinger: No, I worry that arms agreements become a  
21 substitute for political thinking. If arms agreements were  
22 linked to a process of political accommodation, or related or  
23 part of a process, unlinked, of political accommodation, I  
24 would have no problem with them.

25 Secondly, I believe, as I have said, that much of arms



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 76

**Image ID:** 15117319



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 77

**Image ID:** 15117320

1 some conference about the Nixon presidency, and I had read so  
2 much about the illusions of detente that I had begun to  
3 believe it myself. So I started reading what we all said in  
4 that period, and I think if you review what we said, those  
5 ~~were really pretty, I think they were~~ pretty sober statements.

6 But at any rate, leaving aside the merit of the policies  
7 in which I was engaged, in this period we have, any  
8 administration of whatever party has an obligation to  
9 demonstrate to its public that it is sincerely concerned with  
10 easing tensions. It has an equal obligation to demonstrate  
11 to its public that the easing of tensions must be related to  
12 concrete conditions that in fact improve the situation and  
13 are not simply an aspect of a psychiatric treatment of Soviet  
14 leaders.

15 And how to walk this path is the real task of  
16 statesmanship, whatever previous or current administrations  
17 are doing.

18 Senator Sarbanes: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

19 The Chairman: Thank you.


20 Senator Kassebaum.

21 Senator Kassebaum: Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned at the  
22 end of your statement that the strengthening of the Atlantic  
23 unity must be of highest priority, and that you felt that  
24 common diplomacy towards arms control was the most important  
25 component of this policy, and I certainly agree very much



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 78

**Image ID:** 15117321



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 79

**Image ID:** 15117322

1 with that.

2 You also in answer to some other questions earlier said  
3 that it was important for us to understand how the Soviets  
4 conceived the whole strategy of arms control, I suppose, or  
5 particularly in the light of conventional force reduction.

6 But I would like to ask you if you could elaborate on  
7 what you believe the goal should be for conventional arms  
8 control policy, and if you believe that the Alliance, the  
9 Western Alliance itself has an approach to an arms control,  
10 conventional arms control initiative?

11 Dr. Kissinger: Insofar as my own *analysis* ~~thinking~~ is concerned,  
12 I have just begun thinking about it really in a serious way,  
13 and I have gone out to the Rand Corporation, and I have gone  
14 to various places where studies have been made to see what  
15 studies exist so that I can begin engaging my own thinking  
16 and reaching my own conclusions on the subject, and  
17 therefore, I am not really in a great position to make a very  
18 ~~clear statement or make~~ any clear proposals.


19 Now, with respect, however, to our European Allies, I  
20 have a very uneasy feeling with that third zero option. On  
21 the one hand, you have Europeans who are really looking for  
22 an excuse to get rid of the short-range weapons, or at least  
23 reduce them, and we only have 80, so we are not talking about  
24 a very large number.

25 Now, in order to stop this, people say, well, it has got



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 80

**Image ID:** 15117323



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 81

**Image ID:** 15117324

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1 to be part of conventional arms reduction and part of an  
2 overall scheme. The next thing you know, Gorbachev will make  
3 some symbolic move, like taking out the two divisions from  
4 Czechoslovakia that were never there <sup>before 1968</sup> to begin with, and then  
5 people will say, okay, now, you have got your proposal. So  
6 we are no longer justifying modernization in terms of  
7 security; we are justifying it in terms of its contribution  
8 to arms control.

9 There was one witness before the Armed Services Committee  
10 who wants to take out 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons in order  
11 to modernize the 80 Lances, and then make these 80 Lances  
12 dependent on some conventional arms reduction. Well, if we  
13 do that, we are well on the way to the denuclearization of  
14 Germany with all the consequences that this implies.


15 Now, I am not saying that every one of those 4,000  
16 tactical nuclear weapons is sacrosanct, and if the NATO  
17 commander told me that he can do with 500 -- in our period we  
18 took out 2,000 as a unilateral American decision because we  
19 could not see any conceivable use for them. So I am not  
20 saying that they cannot be modified, but we have to be  
21 careful that in the name of arms control, we do not gradually  
22 approach zero in all nuclear categories without knowing that  
23 the conventional adjustments that are being made are of any  
24 real significance.

25 The only systematic study I have seen is one of the Rand



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 82

**Image ID:** 15117325



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 83

**Image ID:** 15117326

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1 understandably has negotiated and always wanted to negotiate  
2 from strength. And in fact, when we have had a sense of  
3 military insecurity, we have been far less inclined to enter  
4 into arms control agreements. We have only done so when we  
5 have at least had the sense of being secure, the confidence  
6 of being secure, that we were willing to move into that arena.

7 And as a consequence of this flaw that you have  
8 identified, has it put us in a position where it jeopardizes  
9 future arms control agreements, including the START talks?

10 Dr. Kissinger: Well, with respect to the first question,  
11 ~~let me~~ you may or may not know that in my memoirs, at a  
12 time when George Shultz was at Bechtel, so I had no  
13 conceivable ulterior motive, I wrote that if I could appoint  
14 one man to any position in this country, it would be George  
15 Shultz ~~and he~~ is a man for whom I have had and still have  
16 the highest regard, and anything I say should be taken in  
17 that context, that this is something on which serious people  
18 can disagree, can have honorable differences of opinion.

19 My assessment is different from his. So it should be in  
20 that context.


21 Senator Dodd: I understand that.

22 Dr. Kissinger: Now, where I think we got off the track  
23 ~~as an administration~~ is that it started with a very  
24 absolutist rhetoric vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and then  
25 under the impact of a variety of causes has changed to a



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 84

**Image ID:** 15117327



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 85

**Image ID:** 15117328

1 rhetoric that is sometimes indistinguishable from what the  
2 various committees for nuclear disarmament around the world  
3 are advocating, ~~so that~~ the antinuclear rhetoric of the  
4 administration, the attempt to prove that they were really  
5 peacefully inclined has led to an extreme oscillation of  
6 position.

7 I think it got off the track at Reykjavik when we  
8 negotiated from a Soviet paper without adequate preparation.


9 What would I have done? You never can tell what you  
10 would have done if you had had responsibility. I would like  
11 to think that I would have proposed something along the lines  
12 of the Walk in the Woods formula with a difference from the  
13 Walk in the Woods that, as I understood it, that formula  
14 required the elimination of all Pershings. I might, I  
15 probably would have proposed cutting them in half, cutting  
16 everything in half, the Soviet deployment, the American  
17 deployment, and make the next 50 percent dependent upon a  
18 substantial reduction of conventional disarmament, a  
19 substantial achievement of conventional disarmament.

20 I think it would have been a better course. I do not  
21 believe that the very quality on which the administration  
22 most prides itself, that they are the first to have reduced  
23 two categories to zero, I think this is an undesirable  
24 objective because it implies that zero in all categories is  
25 attainable, and it is not attainable.



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 86

**Image ID:** 15117329



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 87

**Image ID:** 15117330

1 Senator Dodd: The second question is --

2 Dr. Kissinger: Oh, the second question is is it so  
3 seriously flawed that we are now weaker?

4 Senator Dodd: Weaker politically and militarily, and  
5 what does that mean in terms of future arms control  
6 agreements?

7 Dr. Kissinger: For me, it has been a painful process to  
8 attack people who have been friends and with whom I have been  
9 closely associated. ~~I do this because I want there to be a~~  
10 ~~record that some people in this country pointed out the~~  
11 ~~dangers at a moment when there is really a large consensus~~  
12 ~~that this ought to be done.~~


13 I believe that militarily we are somewhat weaker; that  
14 politically we have paid a big price in elaborating a  
15 differential between the non-nuclear and the nuclear members  
16 of NATO, and between the United States and Europe, a flaw  
17 that determined diplomacy can hopefully repair, but it will  
18 require a lot of effort to get us back to where we were, and  
19 it is a fact that we have to face.

20 Senator Dodd: You said something earlier that I agree  
21 with, nor do I, and you quickly said in the next round of  
22 questions you did not have any quick answers or any answers  
23 necessarily, but that we should rethink how we approach arms  
24 control, and that we are using formulas and approaches that  
25 we have been using for the last 20 or 30 years.



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 88

**Image ID:** 15117331



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 89

**Image ID:** 15117332

105

1 Dr. Kissinger: Well, I would like to refer to the  
2 colloquy with Senator Kerry. You take the 50 percent  
3 reduction, and there is no argument against proceeding with  
4 it, but I asked myself, we are putting this tremendous  
5 effort, years of negotiation, and at the end of which, if a  
6 man from Mars came and said now, tell me in what way is the  
7 situation better now, what would you really say other than  
8 that you have made an agreement?

9 It is not better in the relationship of the two forces to  
10 each other. It makes it probably even harder to threaten  
11 general nuclear war as a retaliation to an attack on NATO,  
12 and since we are the ones that are more dependent on nuclear  
13 weapons than the other, that is an unequal ~~distributions~~ <sup>approach</sup>  
14 ~~you come to agreement after agreement.~~ The best that is  
15 being said for the INF agreement is that the existing weapons  
16 in Europe can do everything INF was going to do.

17 I do not happen to agree with that, I think it leaves us  
18 somewhat worse off. But if it were true, then what have you  
19 achieved? Why is making an agreement that is defended as  
20 irrelevant symbolically so important?


21 Now, I have not come up with a better idea, but I think  
22 all the people that worked with such dedication 30 years ago  
23 to come up with important theories, that equivalence ought to  
24 do it now again. But what it is, I do not know.

25 Senator Dodd: Well, I think is an excellent question,



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 90

**Image ID:** 15117333



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 91

**Image ID:** 15117334

shies away from that discussion because they cannot come up  
with a -- they do not really know how to conceive it, and  
partly because it runs against the American historical  
tradition which is hostile to equilibrium.

And in a world of five or six powers, that is what you  
have to do.

Senator Dodd: Your suggestion I think you made in one  
article I read where you look at the world in the year 2010  
and say what do you want it to look like and work backward.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's work backward from there, correct.

Senator Dodd: My time is up. I will come back with just  
a couple more questions, but Senator Boschwitz.

Senator Boschwitz: I did not read that article about  
2010. I would very much like to have it.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it was 2000 is what I used.

Senator Boschwitz: Pardon me?

Dr. Kissinger: I said 2000, but it was -- he quoted it  
correctly. I think he gave me ten more years.

Senator Dodd: Rudy, would you mind just doing this?

Senator Boschwitz: I will yield back to you.


Senator Dodd: I have just a couple of questions. Why do  
we not each finish up and then let the good Doctor who has  
spent four or five hours go on. And that way we will not tie  
everyone down.

I think Senator Kerry has a line of questions that is apt



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 92

**Image ID:** 15117335



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 93

**Image ID:** 15117336

1 pull back in Afghanistan?

2 Dr. Kissinger: First of all, I want to know how Garthoff  
3 can possibly know to what conclusion the Soviets are coming  
4 ~~because that would be, assuming that were not their~~  
5 ~~conclusion.~~ It is certainly their necessity to have a period  
6 of peace and quiet, and if possible, reduced expenditures.  
7 That I do not question.

8 From our point of view, the issue is whether, on what  
9 terms that is to be achieved.

10 I would not be surprised if the Soviet Union did not have  
11 a clearcut idea of what they had in mind, and after all, I  
12 talked this week to an eminent Soviet visitor who is one of  
13 their leaders in their economic reform, and he described  
14 their reform program to me, and this is a stupendous  
15 undertaking, ~~and~~ I would not be at all surprised if their top  
16 leadership ~~did not simultaneously want to~~ were reluctant  
17 simultaneously to conduct great crises now.


18 That does not mean, however, that five or ten years from  
19 now, if we in the meantime have produced neutralism in  
20 Europe, impotence in Asia, a vacuum in the Middle East, that  
21 they will not exploit it.

22  
23  
24  
25



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 94

**Image ID:** 15117337



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 95

**Image ID:** 15117338

1       Therefore, I think it would be safer if we gave them  
2 difficult problems that were not incompatible with their  
3 self-respect. For example, I do not think that the zero  
4 option was a law of nature.

5       Supposing we had said to them from the beginning we are  
6 deeply concerned about this conventional problem. We are  
7 willing to make realistic agreements with you, but you have  
8 to give -- we have to settle the conventional and nuclear  
9 thing simultaneously. We will pay the first 50 percent up  
10 front in the nuclear field.

11       Why would we assume that that would necessarily have been  
12 rejected? Why is it impossible to start a dialogue that says  
13 that along the analysis that I made previously of what the  
14 world will look like in the next century and what we have to  
15 do now to determine who can do what to whom, where? And  
16 sooner or later we will have to come to some such  
17 accommodation either by confrontation or by negotiation. And  
18 that is what I have in mind.


19       Has the sea change occurred? The problem is, assuming  
20 Gorbachev intends to be conciliatory, whatever that means, he  
21 already has <sup>let</sup> to brutalize the central planning mechanism to  
22 introduce prices. <sup>by</sup> ~~medium~~. He is de facto reducing the importance of  
23 the Communist Party by reducing the importance of the central  
24 planning mechanism because that is where their strength lies.

25       Why should he tackle the KGB and the military when he is



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 96

**Image ID:** 15117339



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 97

**Image ID:** 15117340

[4]  
112

1        Senator Dodd: But are they going to give up the one  
2 thing that maintains them in that status, and that is their  
3 military strength? Are they really going to be willing to  
4 sacrifice and so reduce their military capacity that they run  
5 the risk of both economically and militarily ending up in  
6 that situation?

7        Dr. Kissinger: It would be unlikely. I do not think the  
8 Soviets have a category for dealing with people who are  
9 trying to understand the hell out of them. I think they have  
10 a category for understanding balance of forces, objective  
11 factors, realistic, fair propositions. But when I read that,  
12 ~~when I keep reading -- and this has happened now in every~~  
13 ~~decade~~, that we want to show them farms in the Middle West  
14 and swimming pools. What do we expect them to do? I mean,  
15 what is he supposed to do, come home to the Soviet Union and  
16 say I saw a swimming pool in back yards, and now we are going  
17 to do what?

18        I think it is not a good basis for solving relations  
19 between societies that have such a hugely different  
20 historical experience. Even assuming the best intentions.

21        Senator Dodd: I agree.

22        Well, I have taken a great deal of your time. You have  
23 been very informative and helpful.


24        Dr. Kissinger: Well, thank you.

25        Senator Dodd: I appreciate it immensely.



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 98

**Image ID:** 15117341



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 99

**Image ID:** 15117342

11 [YJ]  
1 countries, and for us it is going to be a major experience  
2 when Mexico emerges on our border with 100 million population  
3 as a country that conducts foreign policy not from the  
4 position of a very inferior country but with aspirations to  
5 some equality. And the same with Brazil.

6 So we will be living in quite a different world in the  
7 21st Century, even though neither of those two countries will  
8 have quite the status of Japan and the others.

9 Senator Boschwitz: Let me return for a moment to the  
10 tactical difference between the ICbMs and the INF weapons.  
11 As you pointed out, that one is, the Russians would have to  
12 have a different perception of when they would be used and  
13 how easily they would be used, particularly if the INF  
14 weapons are in their path and would be overrun.


15 How do the shorter-range -- and there are only a few of  
16 them, as you say -- or the battlefield nuclear weapons, how  
17 do they factor into that kind of thinking?

18 Dr. Kissinger: ~~Well, the trouble with the shorter range~~  
19 ~~weapons, and~~ I think it is an illustration of the difficulty  
20 we have as a nation, and the Alliance has to keep its various  
21 policies in gear. In the same year in which we are  
22 withdrawing the weapons that can reach the Soviet Union and  
23 the Pershing IIs and the GLCMs and that can reach Eastern  
24 Europe through the Pershing Is, a big debate has started  
25 about modernizing the Lances.



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 100

**Image ID:** 15117343



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 101

**Image ID:** 15117344

1 Now, obviously, to Germans, rightly or wrongly, this  
2 looks as if we want to improve the weapons that can kill only  
3 Germans and remove the weapons that are targeted at East  
4 Europeans and the Soviet Union. And that has given rise,  
5 perhaps unfairly, to the impression that Germany is being  
6 singularized, as their phrase goes, singled out for nuclear  
7 risk.

8 Now, the traditional neutralist, seminationalist,  
9 dubious-about-NATO people are picking this up with a  
10 vengeance, and I find it interesting that Chancellor Kohl,  
11 when he was here, really asked for a delay in this policy,  
12 and that some members of his party were reported in the New  
13 York Times to have said we will not even touch this issue  
14 until there is a new President because we do not want the new  
15 President to change his mind again.


16 ~~Now~~ the difference is that these *short range* weapons do not threaten  
17 Soviet territory directly, and therefore, while they are  
18 still an obstacle, they are a lesser and of a different  
19 category than the INF weapons would have been.

20 Senator Boschwitz: Clearly they are a lesser obstacle  
21 than the INF weapon, but would the Russians not have to  
22 factor into their thinking that once these type of weapons  
23 are used, short range, intermediate range, whatever, that the  
24 escalation from that point could almost not be prevented, and  
25 so would it not be?



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 102

**Image ID:** 15117345



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 103

**Image ID:** 15117346

1 Dr. Kissinger: Well, you know, this is a question of  
2 judgment. They might figure that, or they might figure that  
3 once they are used, there will be such a rush to surrender  
4 that ~~the~~ escalation becomes impossible.

5 It depends whether they believe Schmidt or whether they  
6 believe the theorists of escalation.

7 But I do not really think that the real danger is a  
8 Soviet all-out attack heading for the Rhine. The real danger  
9 is a perceived unbalance of forces which will tempt the  
10 Soviets to take the Berlin issue up again, for example, or to  
11 use a Middle East crisis to impose on Europe measures that  
12 amount to de facto neutralization.

13 I noticed that when Shevardnadze was in Bonn, he refused  
14 absolutely to consider any attempt to make Berlin a part of  
15 the Federal Republic or to let the Federal Republic speak for  
16 Berlin, even though this would be an easy way to confirm the  
17 status quo in Germany. But obviously they want to keep that  
18 lever open.

19 Senator Boschwitz: You have pointed out many, many  
20 problems with this arms treaty, and you said you wish that it  
21 had never been negotiated, I believe at one point. You note  
22 that the Russians have given away far less than we, even  
23 though perhaps --


24 Dr. Kissinger: More.

25 Senator Boschwitz: Even though perhaps more in numbers,



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 104

**Image ID:** 15117347



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 105

**Image ID:** 15117348

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1 warhead, mobile missiles, I would think a first strike  
2 capability is almost out of the question.

3 So I would rather spend a little more time and come to  
4 some radical conclusions. Also, with single warhead mobile  
5 weapons, it would be easier to conceive a discriminating use  
6 of these weapons in response to local aggression because the  
7 beginning would not necessarily mean that the next step will  
8 be an assault on the retaliatory forces.

9 Senator Boschwitz: What about the verifiability of the  
10 multiple, of the MIRV, lack of MIRVs?


11 Dr. Kissinger: Well I have not studied that, and one  
12 would have to -- of course, to some extent we face this  
13 problem now because we are putting ~~limits on~~ <sup>on MIRVs</sup> ~~limits~~ <sup>on</sup> the  
14 START agreement, as I understand it, is putting limits on the  
15 total number of MIRVed vehicles. So we must have some  
16 capacity of checking those vehicles like the SS-25s that are  
17 supposed to be single warhead, to make sure they remain  
18 single warhead, because otherwise they might put the SS-20  
19 warheads on <sup>the SS-25s</sup> ~~them~~ and they have three warheads, since the  
20 weapon is more or less the same.

21 Senator Boschwitz: So that the difficulties that we have  
22 with all of these types of treaties at least least you to  
23 suggest that perhaps an elimination of the MIRVs, of the  
24 multiple warheads, would be a more stabilizing type of  
25 approach.



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 106

**Image ID:** 15117349



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 107

**Image ID:** 15117350

1 Dr. Kissinger: That would be a radical change.

2 Senator Boschwitz: What other -- have you thought  
3 through what other kind of approaches we might pursue?

4 Dr. Kissinger: I really have not, no.

5 Senator Boschwitz: May I ask a final question?

6 Dr. Kissinger: I do not know that anybody else has. I  
7 am not familiar with any alternative views on the subject.

8 Senator Boschwitz: It is very difficult. It is very  
9 appealing, the idea of reducing the weapons, and yet the  
10 vulnerabilities of it all, how does --

11 Dr. Kissinger: I just want to keep emphasizing, we ought  
12 to ask the question at the end of an agreement, in what way  
13 we are better off than we were before, not by abstruse  
14 criteria as to number of warheads that have been destroyed,  
15 but in what <sup>concrete</sup> way -- are fewer people under threat, are fewer  
16 weapons under threat, are fewer allies under threat? And if  
17 none of this changes, then we have spent a lot of years on  
18 esoteric exercises.


19 Senator Boschwitz: Well, how does the SDI play into the  
20 alternatives? Is this --

21 Dr. Kissinger: Well, SDI, there is no doubt that it  
22 complicates the issue. On the other hand, I think the  
23 absence of SDI will in time lead to nuclear pacifism, ~~and~~ I  
24 just do not see how a President can keep telling his people  
25 that they are totally exposed to any third country accidental



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 108

**Image ID:** 15117351



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 109

**Image ID:** 15117352

12 CYJ  
1 war, blackmail attack, and that their total vulnerability is  
2 their security.

3 Senator Boschwitz: Is their security.

4 Dr. Kissinger: This is my hang-up, in addition to the  
5 fact that if one could get some defense for the strategic  
6 forces that are not mobile, it would certainly discourage  
7 that sort of blackmail.

8 Senator Boschwitz: I also feel that these treaties do  
9 not really improve the American condition very much, the  
10 human condition very much, and I think that a large part of  
11 coming to these agreements and feeling comfortable with the  
12 agreements is wrapped up in the SDI and the abilities, as I  
13 understand it, of kinetic weapons or others to even now  
14 provide some defense or at least provide a good deal of  
15 deterrence.


16 Dr. Kissinger: If I may say one thing about SDI that I  
17 feel rather strongly about, if we want to give up SDI as a  
18 nation, let's make that decision and get something for it.  
19 But let's not slide into it by pretending that we are  
20 preserving it while de facto giving it up just to get some  
21 other sort of agreement.

22 And I cannot believe that a moratorium on deployment,  
23 coupled with a limitation on testing ~~to the criteria of the~~  
24 ~~narrow interpretation, not that I think we should put it on~~  
25 ~~that basis~~, will have any other consequence except ending



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 110

**Image ID:** 15117353



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 111

**Image ID:** 15117354

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1 bomb or something surreptitiously delivered.

2 Now, that is not going to be cured by an SDI.

3 Dr. Kissinger: SDI does not cure all problems..

4 Senator Kerry: Well, not even all problems. I am just  
5 taking about this notion of blackmail. I mean, it really  
6 strikes me as being something of a red herring.

7 Dr. Kissinger: It seems to me, the fundamental point  
8 that I am making is that if we preserve the option of  
9 developing SDI, we can then have a rational debate in our  
10 country <sup>about</sup> ~~against~~ what dangers we most need to protect  
11 ourselves, while if we forgo both the deployment and the  
12 testing of SDI, a priori, then we are making ourselves  
13 vulnerable to many unforeseen circumstances as well as  
14 developing a strategy that becomes increasingly absurd.

15 So if the Secretary of Defense were to ask my view of now  
16 rapidly he should deploy SDI, there are all kinds of  
17 flexibilities in my view on that. If he were to ask me,  
18 however, whether we should negotiate it away in order to get  
19 a 50 percent reduction, since I do not see the great benefit  
20 of a 50 percent reduction, I have very grave doubts.


21 Senator Kerry: Well, let me ask you, then, when the ABM  
22 treaty was negotiated, you among others talked about the  
23 inherent instability that is created when superpowers both  
24 possess a partial defense system.

25 What are the risks if the United States were to proceed



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 112

**Image ID:** 15117355



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 113

**Image ID:** 15117356

12570  
1 does it not?

2 Dr. Kissinger: Well, the Soviet Union is doing it around  
3 Moscow within the permitted parameters.

4 Senator Kerry: Within the ABM treaty.

5 Dr. Kissinger: Within the ABM treaty, but --

6 Senator Kerry: Certainly not the kinds of exotics that  
7 we are talking about.

8 Dr. Kissinger: No, no, no, they do not have the  
9 capability yet for the kind of exotics that we --

10 Senator Kerry: Is that not dangerous? I mean, is that  
11 not the very partial defense that you talked about?

12 Dr. Kissinger: Well, but they have a partial defense,  
13 not against sophisticated U.S. attack, and to the best of my  
14 knowledge, they are doing a lot of development work and they  
15 have that *Algal* radar in Krasnoyarsk, so that in terms of existing  
16 ABM systems, they are undoubtedly ahead of us.

17 I do not see any huge unilateral advantage -- I could  
18 conceive situations in which both sides have the right to  
19 develop ABM systems, and one side chooses not to deploy them,  
20 as after all we chose not to deploy an ABM system, and still  
21 not get a decisive advantage.


22 Senator Kerry: Well, we both agree on that. In fact, we  
23 can do that right now under the ABM treaty.

24 Dr. Kissinger: Incidentally, I have not studied the  
25 stage 1 of the current SDI program, and I have not taken a



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 114

**Image ID:** 15117357



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
[1 of 3], Image 115

**Image ID:** 15117358

1 Well, I would argue, why do we not go directly towards  
2 something better? But you know, it is easier said than  
3 done.

4 Senator Kerry: Mr. Secretary, we understand that beggars  
5 cannot be choosers, and we have been beggars on this issue  
6 for a long time.

7 Dr. Kissinger: But I do not know why you have to be.

8 Senator Kerry: We would like to move further also  
9 faster, which is why I have said again and again, if we do  
10 not go further, I do not think this Treaty is very meaningful  
11 either.

12 The significance is the potentiality of a first step, and  
13 I understand why you disagree with that, and also want to be  
14 on record as having said that. Because I think the day will  
15 come when we will measure this against where we have wound  
16 up.

17 Dr. Kissinger: And of course, I mean, I have made it  
18 repeatedly clear that I am for ratification. So we are not  
19 talking philosophically.

20 Senator Kerry: We are getting the best of both worlds,  
21 right?

22 Dr. Kissinger: No. I am reluctant. It is my honest  
23 judgment that I may make few friends with ~~that~~ <sup>my</sup> view.

24 Senator Kerry: I do not mean to make light of it. Mr.  
25 Secretary, thank you very, very much. It has been very



**Caption:** Testimony on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb 23, 1988  
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