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**JAPAN'S EMPIRE WAS WON AT BARGAIN PRICES...**

The first fury of Japan's attack drove her troops and her ships as far as the Andamans and the Gilberts, as far as Kiska and Timor, placing the vast shaded area of the map under Japanese domination and forcing United Nations supply routes, indicated by red lines, to follow the distant edges of the Pacific world. Black arrows indicate Japanese offensives that might develop if Japan were given opportunity to buttress her military and economic

strength. A many-pronged offensive against Siberia, a thrust into India, a pincers action against China, even attacks against such important bases as Australia, New Caledonia and the islands to the east, Dutch Harbor, and Midway—these may be part of the bag of tricks that Japan is ready to open whenever she gets the chance. (For an encyclopedic map of this area, see "Pacific Area," the map supplement to *FORNERS* for September, 1942.)



**IT CAN BE WON BACK. THE PRICE: MUCH HIGHER**

Japan is forced to dissipate defensive strength along the rim of conquest; her supply routes, indicated by the lines within the shaded area, are long, complicated, and vulnerable. Note that the inner supply route through the shallow China and South China seas is protected from sea attack but vulnerable to attack from air forces based in China; while the outer routes to Truk and to Kiska are entirely unprotected. The red arrows indicate

the many possibilities for offensives against Japan. Action at the powerful base of Truk can severely weaken Japanese south Pacific strength. The clearing out of Burma would permit heavier supply shipments to China, whence could come attacks on supply lines together with vital drives that would push Japan into the sea. Other possibilities include short-line action from Dutch Harbor and, under certain conditions, a Russian offensive from Siberia.

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Drawn by MICHAEL JOHN BARRETT  
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# WAR IN THE EAST

JAPAN'S EXPLOSION INTO THE MILITARY VACUUM OF THE PACIFIC HAS ENDED. IF WE LET THE ENEMY REST, TIME WILL FIGHT FOR HIM, NOT US

*Although it will not long continue that way, the American phase of the war has thus far been fought almost exclusively in the Pacific, and the terrible shortcomings of our early strategy have been summed up in a cold-blooded, disilluminating phrase—they were expendable. And so they were, those vanished garrisons and broken squadrons that stood up alone to the first onslaughts. The tragedy of their sacrifice lay in the fact that at that time and in those theatres we had nothing but expendables. To the best of their ability, with a gallantry and an intelligence deserving of a better end, they fought the necessary and costly delaying and crippling actions. But the supporting forces on whose behalf they made these last-ditch stands and desperate counterthrusts simply did not then exist.*

*It is strange, now, to recall those early accounts of the fanatical Japanese suicide squadrons, which were supposed to throw themselves easy for the sake of getting in one blow at an enemy too formidable to be taken by orthodox methods. Most of the suicide squadrons, it now appears, set out from our side.*

*It is a democratic cynicism that wars are won in spite of the generals and admirals, the belief being that the individual enterprise and courage of free men will ultimately compensate for the shortcomings of the professionals who are discouraged from perfecting their art between wars. It has been so for a good part of the first year in the Pacific. The men who did the fighting and*

*dying were fine men. They reaffirmed our faith in the power and importance of the individual. We have come to know something about what they saw and went through—the look of the flight deck as the Lexington went down; the short rations and the malaria on Batavia; the night ambushes of the Strait of Macassar and the Java Sea; the fierce exultant mood of the dive bombers at Midway and the Coral Sea; the hard-fought tempo of the fighting marines on Guadalcanal; and the thirst and hunger and despair of the men on the life rafts. That side of the Pacific war has been described many times. The following article is concerned with the strategy and direction of the complex struggle in which the expendables fought and died.*

TEN days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan hurled five divisions and two brigades with supporting artillery, plane, and tank forces against the Chinese forces outside Changsha, scene of two former Japanese defeats. Japan lost; her retreating forces were decimated. In early summer Japan undertook to overrun the provinces of Kiangsi and Chekiang; Japan ran out as fast as she had earlier run in. These were, on the simple basis of the size of the forces involved, the two largest Japanese offensives in the first six months of general war in the Pacific. Elsewhere Japan moved into what was essentially a military vacuum. There was no real war.



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# FORTUNE

## I THE JOB BEFORE US

In the following pages of this section are two articles dealing with certain strategic aspects of the war in which the U.S. is rounding out its first year as a full participant. "War in the East" deals with the major American phase of battle in 1942; the war for the Pacific. "Turnabout in Russia" is an analysis of Germany's second campaign against Russia. These were the main theatres in the third year of this greatest of wars. At the end of this third year the U.S. Army had broken the spell of defensive dispersion, concentrated on a battlefield of its own choice, accepted the responsibility for a major theatre of war. With the invasion of French North Africa the U.S. Army has matured to military initiative on a grand scale. But before Eisenhower's A.E.F. had landed in Algeria, all Anglo-American campaigns east of this continent—in the Atlantic, over Nazi Europe, in Egypt—were incidental, if extremely important incidents, to land war between Russia and Germany, and the sea-air war between the United Nations and Japan.

For Americans, eleven months of the first year have been mostly a period of preparing and learning, of being beaten while feverishly accumulating strength in the rear; of belittling and worried talk and eleven-hour improvisation; and of exhilarating individual actions glowing like beacon fires through the pall of lost campaigns. It has taken us a long time to get started, but despite the blundering, American strength is at last pushing out toward the fighting fronts. The end of the first year was also the end of feeble reluctance. The start of the second year finds the U.S. Army executing a strategic plan of inspired initiative. This second year will see nine million Americans under arms, and twice as many more in war plants grinding out guns and airplanes and tanks and shells and ships for the nine million who will fight.

Let us be humble. These figures don't mean everything—they are not the whole war. Worker for worker, the British are still producing more war materials than we are. The British fleet patrols 80,000 miles of trade routes, over which many of our ships ply; the R.A.F. runs the air offensive against Germany; it was the British Eighth Army that dethroned Wlody Kromel in Egypt

and cleared the path for the U.S. drive into North Africa. And finally there are the Russians and the Chinese of the numberless dead, the scorched earth, and the interminable battlefields. Bitter as it has been, the American battle to date has been easy compared to theirs. Our people have never known such a night as Coventry went through; our armies have yet to fight on the scale of Sevastopol and Stalingrad and Changsha.

But in being humble, let us be also certain of what we do. The strength now flowing out toward the fighting fronts must be firmly and astutely used. That the people are in no mood to tolerate further mismanagement of their war has been demonstrated many ways and most emphatically at the November polls. The hour calls for resolution and daring. It may be that we have arrived at one of those turning points whose glimmerings are visible only to a few in the vanguard. "We have now reached the fourth year of this war," Jan Smuts of South Africa recently announced in the British House of Commons, "and the defense phase has now ended. The stage is set for the last, the offensive phase."

A grand-scale offensive has been launched by the U.S., and it may well be that change of pace and plot which war Jan Smuts predicted. But wherever the last phase is enacted, the weight of America, which can be decisive, must be in the right place. Let us get on with the job, for the hour of destiny may be closer than we think. In Britain and New Guinea, in India, the Persian Gulf, at Liberia and along the coast of the Mediterranean, in dozens of places all over the world, this American vanguard has taken up or is moving into battle stations. From Reykjavik to Surinam to Port Moresby; from the Barents Sea to the Nile to the Brahmaputra—wherever the war is, there are Americans, in one place a lone observer or a squad of technicians, in another whole armies; some running airlines, some building roads and railroads and depots, some fighting, some getting ready. Young men who had never been off the great central plains are today flying across oceans, navigating Africa, threading the Himalayas, with a chart balanced on their knees, a wall of American guns in their mouths, and all the nerve the job takes. These men will never again be strangers anywhere. Many will die, too many, and the nation will be the poorer for their loss. But the others who return, the triumphant armies, will know the world; they will have discharged their responsibilities, and they should know what will have to be done about the peace.

"With confidence in our armed forces, with the unshakable determination of our people, we will gain the inevitable triumph. So help us God!"  
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, DEC. 8, 1941

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